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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
CJSW  Criminal Justice Social Worker 
COPFS Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
CPO  Community Payback Order 
DTTO  Drug Treatment and Testing Order 
EM  Electronic Monitoring or Electronically Monitored 
GPS  Global Positioning System (satellite tracking) 
HDC  Home Detention Curfew 
HMU  Home Monitoring Unit (box unit) 
ISMS  Intensive Support and Monitoring Service (order for children aged under 
16) 
MAPPA Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
MRC  Movement Restriction Condition 
NEMC National Electronic Monitoring Centre 
PID  Personal Identification Device (tag) 
RAM  Remote Alcohol Monitoring 
RF  Radio Frequency 
RFID  Radio Frequency Identification 
RLO  Restriction of Liberty Order 
SPS  Scottish Prison Service 
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Glossary of Key Terms  
Authorising Agency – the agency that imposed or issued the order or licence, which 
includes the Courts, the Scottish Prison Service, the Parole Board, or the Children’s 
Hearings Panel.  
Criminal Justice Social Worker – an accredited social worker based in a local 
authority (Council), who oversees community-based offender supervision, undertakes 
assessments and prepares reports to aid decision-making at various points in the 
criminal justice process. Criminal justice social workers are the Scottish equivalent of a 
probation and parole officer. 
Local Authorities – councils. Currently, there are 32 local authorities in Scotland, and 
community-based offender supervision is devolved or overseen at the level of each local 
authority.  
Monitored Person – in the current Scottish context, ‘monitored person’ is the term used 
by the private monitoring services provider G4S and the researchers to describe 
individuals who are tagged and monitored. In addition to adults monitored through the 
Scottish criminal justice system, children are also subject to monitoring through 
Children’s Hearings System, and they are not commonly spoken of as ‘offenders’, even 
if they have histories of criminal behaviour.  
Premises Holder – the property owner, or a named signatory to the rental lease. 
Procurator Fiscal – a prosecutor (sometimes abbreviated to PF or Fiscal), employed 
within the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS), Scotland’s prosecution 
service. 
Sheriff – a judicial officer; the Scottish equivalent of a magistrate who sits in the middle 
(mainstream) level of criminal and civil courts, the Sheriff’s Courts, which deal with 
higher matters than Justice of the Peace Courts (presided over by lay magistrate), and 
lower or less serious matters than the High Court (presided over by judges or Law 
Lords). 
Stand-alone Order – this term encompasses different meanings in different 
jurisdictions; it is used here in keeping with Nellis and Lehner’s (2012: 2) definition: a 
stand-alone order is a ‘means of execution of a criminal sanction or measure, without 
being combined with other interventions or treatment measures.’ Restriction of Liberty 
Orders (RLOs) and Home Detention Curfews (HDCs) in Scotland are typically referred 
to as stand-alone orders. By way of contrast, ‘integrated’ approaches combine the use 
EM with supervision, supports and/or surveillance.  
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Executive summary 
This research report examines the current uses of electronic monitoring (EM) tagging 
technology in the Scottish criminal justice system. The themes and findings presented 
here form one part of an EU-funded comparative research project1 involving five 
jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. 
Significantly, this is the first comparative study of its kind in Europe. Criminologists 
Professor Gill McIvor and Dr Hannah Graham conducted the Scottish component of the 
research project, which spans a period of two years from May 2014 – April 2016. A 
range of key actors in the Scottish criminal justice field have been involved in this study 
as research participants, and details about the methods used in this study are outlined 
in Section 2 of this report.  
Electronic monitoring (EM) has been a feature of Scottish criminal justice for 15 years, 
based around the use of one type of technology – radio frequency (RF) tags – and home 
curfews and other place-based restrictions. EM is used in its own right as a stand-alone 
community penalty called a Restriction of Liberty Order, as well as with other groups 
like prisoners with early release through a Home Detention Curfew or as a condition of 
a parole licence. Scotland has one of the highest prison population rates in Western 
Europe, and the current and potential uses of electronic monitoring have featured in 
wider discussions of the need to pursue diversion and decarceration. 
To date, the uses of electronic monitoring in Scotland can be characterised as relatively 
simple but stable in approach. Most decision-makers (e.g., the judiciary, prison staff) 
tend to impose relatively standardised curfew regimes restricting people to their home 
for up to 12 hours a day. A large majority of these orders made by courts and prisons 
currently do not involve supervision by criminal justice social workers or requirements 
to participate in rehabilitation programmes or paid or unpaid work. The restriction of 
liberty in making people be restricted to a place (home) or away from a place acts as a 
punishment. However, within the current approach to EM, this study highlights the 
missing links of the options of supervision and supports for rehabilitation and desistance 
from crime. 
Key research findings 
 From 2002-2015, electronic monitoring (EM) in Scotland has operated using a 
simple but relatively stable approach. It has relied on the use of only one type of 
tagging technology. 
 Electronic monitoring is currently used for a range of objectives and penological 
purposes in Scotland. There are positive benefits associated with using electronic 
monitoring as a community penalty, as well as challenges and limitations, some of 
which are outlined in Section 3. 
                                               
1 The research on which this report is based is part of the European project: ‘Creativity and effectiveness in the use 
of electronic monitoring as an alternative to imprisonment in EU member states’ (Hucklesby, Beyens, Boone, Dünkel, 
McIvor and Graham, 2016). Details at: www.emeu.leeds.ac.uk. This report has been produced with the financial 
support of the Criminal Justice Programme of the European Commission (JUST/2013/JPEN/AG/4510). The contents 
are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Commission.- 
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 Access to electronic monitoring appears to depend on the decision-maker involved, 
with geographical and institutional differences observed across Scotland. Some 
judicial officers and courts across Scotland use Restriction of Liberty Orders (EM 
court orders) frequently, whereas others use them rarely. In 2015, the rate of 
Restriction of Liberty Orders imposed by sheriffs in Glasgow was 256 per cent higher 
than that of their Edinburgh counterparts, with 314 RLOs imposed in Glasgow 
compared to 88 RLOs in Edinburgh (G4S, 2016). Some court areas had a marked 
rise in the use of EM orders, for example, in Kilmarnock 60 RLOs were imposed in 
2014, and 196 RLOs in 2015, which signals a 226 per cent increase in one year 
(G4S, 2016; 2015). 
 EM orders in Scotland require people’s consent; people are not tagged against their 
will. There is extensive consensus across participants in this study that consent is, 
and should continue to be required from the monitored person and the premises 
holder (if this is not the monitored person) for equipment installation and home-
based curfew restrictions. Only a few participants explicitly express the view that 
cohabitants should be asked for their consent. 
 EM order completion rates are fairly high in Scotland, with approximately 8 out of 10 
EM orders completed in 2015 (G4S, 2016). 
 Being responsive to issues of diversity and vulnerability (gender, age, language, 
education and low literacy, disability, poverty, victimisation) matters to Scottish 
practitioners and policymakers. Interviewees speak extensively about tailoring EM 
to the needs of offenders and victims. 
 Monitoring of mostly ‘stand-alone’ EM orders (i.e. no supervision) by a private EM 
service provider is associated with limited integration and multi-agency work with 
criminal justice social workers (Scottish equivalent of probation officers) and 
charitable organisations. Yet, many of those interviewed wanted greater integration 
of EM with multi-agency supervision and support. 
 There is moderate support among participants for the (re)introduction of the option 
of electronic monitoring as a pre-sentence modality for the purpose of reducing the 
use of remand in custody. 
 There is moderate support for the introduction of GPS tagging and tracking with 
location-based exclusion zones in cases where this may reduce risk of re-offending 
and promote victim safety. 
 It is time for more strategic development. The key findings and recommendations of 
this report encourage more creative and strategic uses of tagging technologies, 
while not losing sight of the importance of proportionality and consistency in such 
uses. 
Recommendations 
This particular moment in Scottish criminal justice represents an opportunity for 
policymakers and practice leaders to make the uses of electronic monitoring more 
strategic, creative and fit-for-purpose. Consideration should be given to the following, 
which are based on the findings of this research: 
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1. Clarify national breach criteria and responses to non-compliance. Consider 
consolidating breach reporting timeframes and thresholds into two nationally 
available options – standard and intensive – to foster consistency between decision-
makers and authorising agencies. 
2. Introduce mechanisms to give courts and prisons the choice of imposing a 
supervision requirement with EM modalities involving a ‘supervising officer’, or to 
make EM a condition of other orders, to enable more multi-agency work and 
reintegrative supports for monitored people. Implementing integration and the option 
of supervision will necessitate commensurate funds and resources. However, the 
introduction of supervising officers will enable decision-making to reduce the volume 
of queries for order variation which are currently being put before authorising 
agencies such as the courts, which may reduce workload churn and costs. 
3. Authorising agencies should consistently instruct the private EM services provider 
about the number and gender of field officers needed to visit each person/household. 
This is necessary to further ensure excellent duty of care and risk management with 
regard to all parties involved. 
4. Introduce and encourage wider use of mechanisms which motivate and reward 
monitored people’s compliance and desistance, including graduated changes in 
regimes and conditions, as well as a mechanism to allow authorising agencies to 
terminate an EM order or condition early. 
5. Abolish the statutory exclusion for Home Detention Curfew (HDC) licences which 
permanently excludes prisoners who have previously breached a HDC licence. It is 
inefficient and inequitable. 
6. Consider more creative collective uses of EM with people given a custodial 
sentence, similar to Scandinavian and Dutch approaches, which feature integrated 
supports for desistance. 
7. More data should be collected and released about the current uses of electronic 
monitoring, and more independent research is needed in the future: 
a. A greater quantity and quality of data (particularly statistical data, as well as 
aggregate demographic information about monitored people) needs to be 
collected about the effectiveness of electronic monitoring in Scotland and 
made publicly available. 
b. Ensure future developments in EM policies and practices are informed by the 
perspectives and lived experiences of monitored people, their families, and 
victims. More independent research is needed. 
8. Initiate greater awareness-raising among professionals, media and the public about 
electronic monitoring in Scotland.  
Electronic monitoring is a tool which can be used for different purposes; however, EM 
is not a panacea and any expectations about its impact after monitoring has ceased 
should be truncated. Monitored people benefit from positive supports and opportunities 
to help them leave crime behind, which extend far beyond time-limited and place-based 
restrictions. Tagging technologies and equipment should not be allowed to 
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unnecessarily dominate discussions of electronic monitoring and offender supervision, 
now or in the future. Objectives of supporting rehabilitation and desistance are better 
realised in the context of supervisory relationships and desistance-oriented supports 
and regimes in which EM may only be one feature (see Graham and McIvor, 2015). 
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Introduction 
The Scottish research findings and recommendations presented here, in combination 
with the comparative findings across the five jurisdictions (featured in a separate report 
and briefing paper, see Hucklesby et al., 2016a, 2016b), promote deeper understanding 
of current uses of electronic monitoring, with a view to further development of ethical 
and effective uses in jurisdictions across Europe. The structure of this report, including 
the ways in which sub-headings are worded and organised, is a replication of a format 
adopted consistently across the country reports for each of the five jurisdictions in this 
research project, as well as the comparative report. 2 
Electronic monitoring of offenders has existed in Scotland for 15 years, yet it has been 
the subject of few independent academic studies during this time. Those studies which 
have been conducted are relatively small and tend to be focused on one particular EM 
modality or policy initiative. In addition to its contributions to the wider focus on Europe, 
this research report offers one of the most recent and detailed empirical accounts of 
how electronic monitoring is currently used in Scotland (albeit with the 
acknowledgement that significant changes may be enacted in the near future). Yet such 
knowledge is built upon and informed by the extant contributions of others, whose 
contributions are cited throughout this report. The analytical insights of Mike Nellis 
(2016a; 2016b; 2015; 2014; 2009; 2007; 2006a, 2006b), a Scotland-based scholar with 
internationally recognised expertise in electronic monitoring, stand out above the rest 
as offering one of the most cogent accounts within what remains a small body of Scottish 
EM literature. Furthermore, in 2015, concurrently to conducting the fieldwork for this 
research which is funded and commissioned independent of the Scottish context, we 
were separately commissioned by the Scottish Government through the Scottish Centre 
for Crime and Justice Research (SCCJR) to co-author a Scottish and international 
review of existing literature to examine the uses, purposes and impact of electronic 
monitoring in different jurisdictions and make recommendations regarding the national 
context (see Graham and McIvor, 2015).  
It is acknowledged from the outset that this research has been conducted in a period of 
time characterised by substantial interest among Scottish policymakers, practitioners 
and other stakeholders in electronic monitoring and its potential development in the near 
future. Interviews for this study should be contextualised as occurring following a period 
of national consultation on electronic monitoring (Scottish Government, 2014; 2013a). 
Following the Consultation, the Scottish Government Working Group on Electronic 
Monitoring has been established to consider the governance and potential future uses 
of EM, and it is expected that they will make recommendations to the Cabinet Secretary 
for Justice shortly. Throughout the period of consultation and subsequent 
multidisciplinary practitioner events across Scotland, there has been concerted efforts 
by the Scottish Government and other stakeholders to mobilise the judiciary, prisons 
and other criminal justice actors to reduce the prison population and make greater use 
of community sanctions and measures, including electronic monitoring, as well as early 
release from prison using EM. As such, the research findings and recommendations 
conveyed here are representative of a particular social, historical and political moment 
in Scottish criminal justice. 
                                               
2 Each of the five country reports and the comparative report are available online at the research project 
website: http://emeu.leeds.ac.uk/   
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Section 1: Legal and organisational context 
Section 1 sets the scene by providing an overview of the legislative arrangements, 
policy and organisational contexts in which electronic monitoring operates. It also briefly 
hints at the recent and current political climate and associated Scottish Government 
priorities which may bear some influence on participants’ perspectives in the period in 
which data collection for this research occurred. 
1.1 Actors involved in the implementation of electronic monitoring 
In European jurisdictions, there are two major approaches to the implementation of 
electronic monitoring (see also the comparative briefing paper and report, Hucklesby et 
al., 2016a; 2016b). The approach taken in Scotland is coherent with what may be 
referred to as an ‘Anglophone model’ of privatised service provision, also used in 
England and Wales, where electronic monitoring is contracted to a private company. In 
contrast, other jurisdictions such as the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium adopt what 
might be termed as a more continental European approach, where electronic monitoring 
is implemented by government criminal justice organisations, with the role of private 
corporations limited to, for example, a subcontract to provide them with EM equipment. 
A range of stakeholders are involved in the implementation and operation of electronic 
monitoring in Scotland. Electronic monitoring legislation and policy are set nationally by 
the Scottish Government. Electronic monitoring is implemented by a private services 
provider, currently G4S, under contract to the Scottish Government. G4S Scotland 
staffing includes managers, monitoring officers and field support officers (who keep an 
inventory of equipment, issue equipment to the field officers and send faulty equipment 
to the suppliers – G4S Monitoring Technologies - in Leicester, UK). Monitoring officers 
also work as field officers so that they have all round experience and can provide 
technical advice to their colleagues involved in field visits. The majority of the staff 
(around 70 per cent) are based in the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC) 
from where much of the population base of Scotland is accessible within 1.5 hours of 
driving. There are, in addition, approximately 20 staff who work from home (including 
some who are ‘retained’) and who undertake the tasks of field officers in the north of 
Scotland and Western and Northern Isles. 
Key criminal justice actors involved in the implementation of EM in Scotland include 
judicial officers (mainly sheriffs and, much less commonly, lay justices), criminal justice 
social workers and criminal justice social work assistants from local authorities, 
procurators fiscal (prosecutors), prison governors and Scottish Prison Service staff 
responsible for overseeing Home Detention Curfews, the Parole Board for Scotland, 
Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), Police Scotland staff, the 
Children’s Panel and Youth Justice in the case of children and young people who are 
tagged, and the private EM services provider.  
Some victims of crime may have the opportunity for some input into the implementation 
of EM because of the nature of ‘away from’ place-based restrictions and EM equipment 
being placed in their property, as well as opportunities for formal victim notification and 
input with specific types of EM modalities. For example, for prisoners eligible for early 
release on HDC, the Scottish Prison Service takes part in a victim notification scheme 
available if a prisoner is serving a sentence of over 18 months. In this case, victim(s) 
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may be notified and able submit representation to inform executive decisions no less 
than two weeks prior to a HDC licence decision being made. 
Currently, there are 32 local authorities (where criminal justice social work services 
reside) and six sheriffdoms (court areas) across Scotland. At the time of writing, the 
Scottish Prison Service (n.d.) has 13 prisons which are run by the government prison 
service, and 2 prisons which are run by private companies under contract to the SPS. 
The range of organisations, facilities and actors involved means that localism remains 
an influential feature of Scottish criminal justice. It also means that, as some of the 
findings of this research and the available data by others show, there are geographical 
and institutional differences which can be observed across Scotland in the 
implementation of electronic monitoring.  
1.2 Legal and contractual framework 
The following sub-sections involve discussion of adults and young adult offenders, as 
well as children and young people (under the age of 16 years old). However, the 
dominant focus of this research project centres on adults involved in the criminal justice 
system in Scotland.  
1.2.1 Adults and young adult offenders 
Electronic monitoring was initially introduced in Scotland on a pilot basis in 1998 as a 
means of monitoring compliance with Restriction of Liberty Orders (RLOs), which are 
imposed by courts. Electronically monitored RLOs were regarded as a mechanism for 
restricting the liberty of the offender in the community, potentially ‘in a way which 
reduces the risk of re-offending, where previous offending has been linked to particular 
locations or events’ (Scottish Office, 1996: para 9.13). Restriction of Liberty Orders 
(RLOs) were established through Section 245A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) 
Act 1995 (as introduced by Section 245A of the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 
1997) and enabled the courts to require that offenders stay in a specified place for up 
to 12 hours a day, for a period of up to 12 months, or away from a specified place for 
up to 24 hours a day for up to 12 months. They could be imposed as a stand-alone 
option, or in conjunction with a supervisory order. They are primarily targeted at young 
offenders and adult offenders; however, it should be noted that Section 245A of the 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 as amended by section 12 of the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 allows for RLOs on persons under the age of 16 
dealt with by the Court system – although these cases are rare and, in some years, not 
used at all..Restriction of Liberty Orders were subsequently rolled out nationally in 
Scotland in April 2002, following an evaluation of the pilots (Lobley and Smith, 2000) 
and a consultation by the Scottish Executive on the wider potential of electronic 
monitoring in the supervision of offenders (Scottish Executive, 2000). 
The use of electronic monitoring was further extended by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) 
Act 2003, which introduced provisions for electronically monitored curfews as a 
condition of a probation order  (S. 46), or drug treatment and testing order (DTTO) (S.47) 
and as a condition of parole (S.40). The same legislation also specified that the RLO 
should be deemed an alternative to custody (S. 50 (3)) by stipulating that orders should 
only be imposed for offences punishable by imprisonment where the alternative would 
be a period of imprisonment or detention. Electronic monitoring as a condition of bail (or 
EM bail) was introduced on a pilot basis in three areas in 2005 to seek to improve bail 
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decision-making and encourage compliance with bail. However, a decision was taken 
not to roll EM bail out nationally following an evaluation of the pilot which found that 
applications for electronically monitored bail represented a very small proportion (less 
than five per cent) of potentially eligible cases, with the result that the remand population 
in the pilot areas was reduced by less than two per cent and there was no evidence of 
improved confidence in public safety attributable to electronically monitored as opposed 
to standard bail (Barry, Malloch, Moodie, Nellis, Knapp, Romeo, and Dhanasiri, 2007).  
HDCs were introduced in Scotland in 2006 for prisoners serving sentences of less than 
four years through the Management of Offenders etc. (Scotland) Act 2005. Initially, 
prisoners assessed as suitable could be released up to a maximum period of four and 
a half months prior to their release date to serve the remaining part of their sentence at 
home (or another suitable address) subject to an electronically monitored curfew (for 
between 9 and 12 hours per day). In 2008, the maximum duration of HDC was extended 
to six months and the scheme was extended to long term prisoners (serving sentences 
of four years or more) who have been recommended for release by the Parole Board at 
the half-way stage of their sentence. A number of statutory exclusions are set out in the 
legislation ensuring that the following types of prisoners are not eligible for early release 
on a HDC licence: 
 prisoners who are required to register as sex offenders; 
 prisoners who are subject to an Extended Sentence; 
 prisoners who are subject to a Supervised Release Order; 
 prisoners who are subject to a Hospital Direction (including Transfer for 
Treatment); 
 foreign national prisoners awaiting deportation; and 
 prisoners who have previously been recalled to prison having been released on 
licence. 
The rules governing the Victim Notification Scheme in Scotland mean that victims are 
only able to be notified and make a submission to the Scottish Prison Service prior to a 
HDC licence being granted if the prisoner applying for HDC is serving a sentence of 
over 18 months. HDC licences are considered to be a stand-alone order, in that there 
is no mandatory supervision requirement; however, voluntary throughcare services are 
available to prisoners who choose to participate in them. 
A 2011 evaluation of HDCs indicated that most prisoners released on HDC were serving 
sentences of between six months and two years, their offending profile tended to be 
less serious than that of the Scottish prison population as a whole and proportionally 
more use was made of HDC with women than with men (Armstrong, Malloch, Nellis, 
and Norris, 2011). HDC was perceived by respondents in Armstrong and colleagues’ 
(2011) study principally as a mechanism for managing the prison population and the 
pressures occasioned by overcrowding although they also believed that it could help 
ease the prisoner back into society and support the process of reintegration.  
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People granted a parole licence may be subject to an electronic monitoring condition, 
and this may be applied in general, as well as specifically to parolees convicted of sexual 
crime or violent crime who are managed through Multi-Agency Public Protection 
Arrangements (MAPPA). Provisions within Sections 10 and 11 of the Management of 
Offenders etc. (Scotland) Act 2005 establish that electronic monitoring services 
providers have a ‘duty to cooperate’ with statutorily ‘responsible authorities’ (Scottish 
Prison Service, Police Scotland and local authorities) in the joint assessment and 
management of sex offenders. The Parole Board has the responsibility for making the 
decision about whether a sex offender is subject to electronic monitoring upon release 
from custody (Scottish Government, 2013), and EM is not imposed automatically in all 
cases of sex offenders managed by MAPPA. The Parole Board’s decision is informed 
by the other stakeholders involved (e.g., Scottish Prison Service, Police Scotland, local 
authorities). EM as a condition of a parole licence can be granted for up to 24 hours in 
both the case of ‘away from’ restrictions as well as restrictions to a place (which is unlike 
the other orders); however, it is understood that curfews are not routinely imposed on 
parolees for more than 12 hours a day and a strong rationale is needed to impose longer 
curfews, for example, up to 17 hours a day. 
In 2011, following the recommendation of the Scottish Prisons Commission (2008), the 
Community Payback Order (CPO) was introduced in Scotland through the Criminal 
Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 to replace existing community sentences 
(probation, community service and supervised attendance orders). RLOs and DTTOs 
were not ‘rolled up’ into the new order. The RLO, specifically, was retained ‘for high tariff 
offenders where the safety of the public in general or of particular individuals (for 
example, in relation to a conviction related to domestic violence) is at risk’ (Scottish 
Government, 2008: 11). While electronic monitoring cannot be imposed as a condition 
of a Community Payback Order (CPO), it is possible for an RLO and a CPO to be 
imposed concurrently, providing offenders with access to supervision and other services 
as required. Moreover, an additional requirement of electronic monitoring - a restricted 
movement requirement - was made available to the court (through Section 227ZE of 
the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010) in the event of a CPO being 
breached.  Like an RLO, a restricted movement requirement requires the individual to 
remain at a specific address for up to 12 hours a day and/or to stay away from a specific 
address for up to 24 hours a day, with scope for flexibility regarding the monitoring 
periods imposed. Because the restricted movement requirement can only be imposed 
following breach of a CPO, failures to comply are considered serious breaches and 
must be notified to the court within a maximum period of three days from detection. For 
more in-depth discussion of the legal framework and uses of electronic monitoring in 
Scotland, see the review by Graham and McIvor (2015). 
1.2.2 Children and young people 
Although the focus of this research is on the use of electronic monitoring with adults 
(defined as those aged 16 years and older in Scotland), it is also important to note its 
use with children and young people. Proposals to introduce electronic monitoring of 
under 16 year-olds were first contained in a consultation paper Putting Our Communities 
First: A Strategy for Tackling Anti-social Behaviour, published by the Scottish Executive 
in 2003 in which options included making electronic monitoring available through the 
Children’s Hearings System and extending the availability of RLOs to young people 
aged under 16 years sentenced in the courts. Analysis of consultation responses 
identified some cautious support for the use of electronic monitoring with young people, 
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so long as it was introduced as part of a holistic range of services and supports, was 
considered a high tariff option that would be suited only to a small number of young 
people, was subject to regular review and was initially developed on a pilot basis to 
enable its effectiveness with young people to be assessed. It was also stressed that the 
impact on families would need to be carefully assessed and appropriate supports 
provided (Flint et al., 2003). 
An electronically monitored movement restriction condition (MRC) for children and 
young people under 16 years of age is dealt with in the Children’s Hearings System as 
an alternative to secure accommodation. Legislatively enacted in January 2005 through 
Section 135 of the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 and Section 70 of the 
Intensive Support and Monitoring (Scotland) Regulations 2005, MRCs were introduced 
in the context of the Intensive Support and Monitoring Service (ISMS) orders, which was 
piloted in six sites in 2005. ISMS involved intensive, multi-agency services tailored to 
individual young people’s needs and risks, and were subsequently rolled out nationally 
in 2008. Furthermore, the imposition of a Movement Restriction Condition must meet 
one or more of the statutory inclusion criteria (which are the same as those needed for 
inclusion to secure accommodation): 
(a) that the child has previously absconded and is likely to abscond again and, if the 
child were to abscond, it is likely that the child’s physical, mental or moral welfare would 
be at risk; 
(b) that the child is likely to engage in self-harming conduct; 
(c) that the child is likely to cause injury to another person. 
Relatively limited use has been made of MRCs since their inception, despite some 
evidence that they are considered by young people and by social workers to be 
preferable to secure accommodation, and by parents as being helpful in enabling young 
people to resist peer pressure, reducing conflict regarding when the young person 
should be home and keeping the young person safe (MacQueen and Rigby, 2010; Khan 
and Hill, 2007). 
1.2.3 Contractual framework 
Electronic monitoring in Scotland is funded by the Scottish Government Justice 
Department (Community Justice Division). As has already been mentioned, the service 
is currently provided by one private contractor – currently G4S - under a five year 
contract to the Scottish Government which was awarded in September 2012 and began 
in April 2013 following a competitive tendering process. Previous private EM services 
providers in Scotland include Reliance and Serco.  
Some contractual obligations to which the current private EM services provider is bound 
implicitly feature in the practices described in this research; however, the content of the 
contract itself is confidential, and not available to the researchers or the public. What is 
clear is that the current contractual framework involves close working arrangements and 
scrutiny of contractual compliance, with ‘tight’ accountability ‘via real-time access to the 
contractor’s data on all tagged offenders, monthly performance audits and regular 
meetings with managers’ (Nellis, 2016a: 184). 
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1.3 Scottish political and policy context 
While there have been some modest changes in the stages at which EM is available in 
the criminal justice process, and to whom, there have not yet been wholesale departures 
from a relatively standard approach of predominantly using RF tagging and home 
curfews. This, however, may change in light of recent and current developments in the 
realms of criminal justice policy and politics. Scotland has one of the highest prison 
population rates in Western Europe, with a steady rise in prisoner numbers from 2000-
2010, as illustrated in Figure 1. This has not gone unnoticed in local policy discussions 
in recent years. 
Figure 1 Prison population rate (per 100,000 of national population) in Scotland, 
2000-2015 
 
The most recent estimate of the Scottish prison population rate is 143 per 100,000 of 
national population (Walmsley, 2016). To put this in context, Scotland’s prison 
population rate of 143 is noticeably higher when compared to other European countries, 
for example, Sweden (55), Finland (57), Denmark (61), the Netherlands (69), Germany 
(78), Ireland (80), Italy (86), Croatia (89), and France (95) (Walmsley, 2016). The high 
Scottish prison population rate has featured in different policy and political discussions 
in recent years. 
In the autumn of 2013, the Scottish Government published a Consultation on the 
potential development of electronic monitoring in Scotland to better take advantage of 
advances in technology, in particular the availability of improved GPS technology (see 
Scottish Government, 2013a). The consultation identified EM as currently being used in 
Scotland to: 
 restrict offenders’ movements and monitor their compliance with conditions; 
 support prisoners’ reintegration into the community; 
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 provide an element of structure to support the completion of rehabilitative 
programmes (and possibly disrupt patterns of offending behaviour). 
At a general level, the Consultation document sought views on how electronic 
monitoring could be better integrated with other supervision and support services, how 
the system of breach and enforcement could be developed, and identification of the 
barriers to increasing the rates of use of electronic monitoring (see Scottish 
Government, 2013a). Part of the Consultation focused on how the current electronic 
monitoring service could be improved, including whether it should be extended to 
include new areas, whether existing systems and processes of information exchange 
between agencies are effective, which offenders should receive electronic monitoring, 
whether the current maximum of curfew hours per day is appropriate, how well 
electronic monitoring operates for children and young people as an alternative to secure 
care, and whether the implementation of EM could better incentivise compliance with 
electronically monitored orders. Views were sought on the use and development of new 
electronic monitoring technologies, including GPS, remote alcohol monitoring (RAM) 
and the potential development of an electronic reminder service. 
Fawcett, Costley and Granville (2014) collated and analysed the Consultation 
responses. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a number of themes and issues were raised in 
response to the Consultation that were also raised by participants in this study, including 
the need to further develop the current system for handling breach, as well as identifying 
the need for a greater orientation towards and opportunities for rehabilitation. There was 
moderate support for integration of EM service provision with statutory service provision, 
including criminal justice social work. Interestingly, their analysis indicated that: 
The main barriers to greater use of electronic monitoring related to a perceived 
lack of understanding and awareness generally, public perceptions of electronic 
monitoring as a ‘soft’ punishment, the need for evidence on the effectiveness of 
electronic monitoring in terms of reducing reoffending and concerns about the 
appropriateness of offenders’ living arrangements when under electronic 
monitoring. A small number of respondents also cited privacy and human rights 
issues as an area of potential concern (Fawcett et al., 2014: 1). 
Following the Consultation, the Scottish Government established an Electronic 
Monitoring Working Group to consider policy and practice development and potential 
legislative change. In our review of the Scottish and international evidence (Graham 
and McIvor, 2015) commissioned by that working group, we made a series of 
recommendations based on the findings of our review (see Graham and McIvor, 2015).  
At events in August and September 2015, the Scottish Government Cabinet Secretary 
for Justice, Michael Matheson MSP, spoke to practitioners and the media about the 
Scottish Government’s vision for the future uses of electronic monitoring. This vision 
was positioned against the backdrop of Scotland’s high prison population rate, 
prompting a focus among policymakers on its use as an alternative to reduce the use 
of custody, particularly short-term prison sentences. The following excerpt of 
Matheson’s (2015) statements is indicative of some of the key issues being considered 
at this particular moment in Scottish history:  
One of the obvious ways in which we can already start to look at alternatives to 
the traditional custodial estate is by the use of electronic monitoring. Each day in 
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Scotland we currently monitor around 800 people, two-thirds of whom are serving 
community-based sentences, with the remaining one third transitioning from 
custody to the community. I believe that we can, and I also believe that we should, 
be doing more to increase this number. In 2013/14, nine times as many people 
received custodial sentences of less than six months as were issued with 
restriction of liberty orders. Evidence from other countries shows us that electronic 
monitoring can help people to maintain connections with their family, their 
community and their employment - the very things that short-term sentences are 
so disruptive of ... Electronic monitoring should no longer be seen as an end in 
itself, but one which, when set against a wider package of care, can be used as 
part of a credible community sentence which is effective at reducing reoffending 
in the longer term... (Matheson, 2015: 6) 
Matheson’s (2015) comments called attention to a wider Scottish Government policy 
agenda to shift towards the increased use of non-custodial sentences. This has 
coincided with embarking on a relatively large-scale re-design of community justice in 
Scotland. 
Separately but concurrently to the period in which the EM Consultation was conducted, 
a Ministerial Group on Offender Reintegration was established in October 2013 and 
released a final report in September 2015. Its brief was to address the demand for better 
integration between the justice system and other services and systems, to focus the 
role and contributions of actors and organisations outside of criminal justice to 
supporting the community reintegration of individuals leaving custody. The need to 
reduce the use of custody, especially in the form of short-term prison sentences, was 
highlighted in the Ministerial Group’s (2015) final report, like other reports before it. Also 
in 2015, the Scottish Government established a national Consultation on a proposal to 
strengthen the presumption against short prison sentences. That Consultation closed in 
mid-December 2015, and many of the submissions have been made publicly available 
online.  
Those discussions and consultations notwithstanding, the two year timeframe and the 
bounded parameters of this research project, combined with a lack of available detailed 
data, do not allow for us as researchers to draw concrete conclusions about the nature 
of the relationship between uses of EM and uses of custody (including any reductions 
in prison populations). We can only observe that participants in this research, and 
Scottish policymakers and politicians appear to see a link between EM and reducing 
the use of custody, now and into the future. 
1.4 Adherence to the Council of Europe recommendation on electronic 
monitoring 
In 2014, the Council of Europe made a recommendation (Recommendation CM/Rec 
(2014) 4) about electronic monitoring in EU member states, containing 40 
recommendation-style rules or principles. This recommendation is an influential form of 
‘soft law’, in that it is not legally binding. It was introduced with the aim ‘to define a set 
of basic principles related to ethical issues and professional standards enabling national 
authorities to provide just, proportionate and effective use of different forms of electronic 
monitoring in the framework of the criminal justice process in full respect of the rights of 
the persons concerned’ (Council of Europe, 2014: 2). One of the questions asked of 
some interview participants in this study was to ask of their awareness of the 
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recommendation, and the extent to which this influences and is applied in Scotland. 
Very few participants were aware that this recommendation existed. 
The Council of Europe (2014) recommendation divides principles into different sub-
categories: basic principles; conditions of the execution of electronic monitoring at the 
different stages of the criminal justice process; ethical issues; data protection; staff; and 
work with the public, research and evaluation. Overall, the current uses of electronic 
monitoring largely adhere to the recommendation, which is a strong and positive 
threshold on which to build future developments. However, a few points of differentiation 
can be observed. The areas where there is moderately strong adherence to the 
recommendation are ethical issues (rules 26-28) and data protection (rules 29-32). 
Different types of practitioners in this study speak at length (see Section 7 of this report) 
about ethical considerations in working with diversity and vulnerability in the lives of 
monitored people. There are moderately strong data protection protocols in place, with 
moderately strict accountability mechanisms put in place and overseen by the Scottish 
Government. With regard to electronic monitoring staff (rules 33-38), we are unable to 
offer a view about private EM staff skills and training, as it is outwith the scope of this 
study and there is a lack of publicly available data. However, field work observations 
and the length of EM work experience that numerous field officers have appear to 
suggest moderate adherence to the recommendation. Most of the conditions of 
execution of EM (rules 15-25) are in place in Scotland, with the exception of the option 
of EM as an alternative execution to a custodial sentence, and variability in practice in 
the extent to which victims of crime give prior informed consent to involvement in the 
case of ‘away from’ restrictions. Finally, one of the basic principles (rules 1-14) is notably 
missing in Scotland: the combination of EM with other professional interventions and 
supportive measures aimed at the social reintegration of offenders in order to seek and 
promote desistance from crime. 
Section 2: Methodology and research process 
Section 2 describes the Scottish research design and methods. This is a mixed methods 
study which is predominantly based on qualitative insights from a sample of different 
criminal justice actors in the field; however, descriptive statistics and other types of 
secondary data helpfully complement participants’ contributions in interviews and 
ethnographic observations. The following discussions relate to the Scottish component 
of the international research project; however, as indicated in the comparative briefing 
paper and comparative report (see Hucklesby et al., 2016a; 2016b), collectively, 
involved a total of 75 days of ethnographic observation and over 190 interviews across 
the five jurisdictions. The research project underwent a process of human research 
ethics committee review and approval before data collection commenced. Institutional 
permissions were sought where they were required. 
2.1 Observations 
The following ethnographic observations have been completed with G4S, the current 
private electronic monitoring services provider in Scotland: 
 2.5 hours across one day in March 2015 involving two researchers observing the IT 
and phone system, administration processes and equipment storage and 
maintenance at the G4S National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC) in 
Uddingston, Glasgow. 
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 Nine hours across three days in March and June of observations involving two 
researchers of the evening ‘backshift’ (6:00pm – 9:00pm) at the G4S National 
Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC) in Uddingston, Glasgow. 
 42 hours across five days in April and June of observations of the evening ‘field shift’ 
(from 3:30pm to approximately 12 midnight) involving two researchers 
accompanying field officers into the homes of monitored people and other locations 
across Scotland. 
Both male and female field officers were observed during the evening ‘field shifts’. In 
engaging in ethnographic observation and taking field notes, the researchers wore ID 
tags to identify them as a guest observing the process, demarcating their role from that 
of the G4S field officer they accompanied. Great care has been taken not to collect 
information about the personal demographics and contact details of monitored people 
and other people present in the property at the time of observation, nor was any 
information sought about their offence histories or offence for which they are tagged. 
The purpose of the ethnographic observation was to witness the implementation and 
application processes of electronic monitoring in a variety of modalities and 
circumstances. An observation guide, developed with the research partners from the 
other jurisdictions in this project, was used to guide the priority topics and process 
details for the researchers to focus on.  
2.2 Interviews 
Interviews have been conducted with 30 participants between May and December 2015. 
A list of interview participants is provided in Table 1; it should be noted that this table 
lists interviewees by job role type, not necessarily in the consecutive order in which 
interviews were conducted, and that a few practitioners chose to be interviewed in pairs. 
Information sheets and consent forms were provided to all participants in advance of 
the interview taking place. The interviews range in length, with 55 minutes being the 
approximate average duration. If the interviews and fieldwork observations are 
combined, a total of 14 staff from G4S, the current EM services provider in Scotland, 
have participated in this research.  
With respect to the sample of criminal justice actors, participants across different roles 
were recruited from four courts located across three Sheriffdoms (i.e. half of the 
Sheriffdoms) in Scotland. Each member of the judiciary interviewed had worked in at 
least one court area other than the one they currently work in. Furthermore, each of the 
criminal justice social workers from different local authorities across Scotland has a 
considerable number of years of professional practice experience, including in frontline 
operational roles. Interviews were also conducted with two staff from a charitable or 
third sector representative organisation. 
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Table 1 List of interview participants by work role type 
Interviewee 
1 
Criminal Justice Social 
Worker 
Interviewee 
16 
Sheriff 
Interviewee 
2 
Police Scotland Interviewee 
17 
Criminal Justice Social 
Worker 
Interviewee 
3 
Criminal Justice Social 
Worker 
Interviewee 
18 
Sheriff 
Interviewee 
4 
Criminal Justice Social 
Worker 
Interviewee 
19 
Sheriff 
Interviewee 
5 
G4S staff Interviewee 
20 
Sheriff 
Interviewee 
6 
G4S staff Interviewee 
21 
Scottish Government 
Justice 
Interviewee 
7 
G4S staff Interviewee 
22 
Scottish Government 
Justice 
Interviewee 
8 
G4S staff Interviewee 
23 
Parole Board for Scotland 
Interviewee 
9 
G4S staff Interviewee 
24 
Scottish Prison Service 
Interviewee 
10 
Criminal Justice Social 
Worker 
Interviewee 
25 
Scottish Prison Service 
Interviewee 
11 
G4S staff  Interviewee 
26 
Scottish Prison Service 
Interviewee 
12 
G4S staff Interviewee 
27 
Criminal Justice Social 
Worker 
Interviewee 
13 
G4S staff Interviewee 
28 
Scottish Prison Service 
Interviewee 
14 
G4S staff Interviewee 
29 
Representative 
organisation (third sector) 
Interviewee 
15 
Scottish Prison Service Interviewee 
30 
Representative 
organisation (third sector) 
Interview data was transcribed, and coded using an agreed coding schedule developed 
between the five research partners, based on a shared interview schedule.  
2.3 Statistical data  
The numbers of people being monitored at any given time are dynamic, and appear to 
be steadily increasing in recent months. There were 808 live EM orders under 
supervision from the National Electronic Monitoring Centre in Scotland on Thursday 11 
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June 2015 plus 54 SMS (cases that are not being actively monitored – e.g., in police 
custody). On 3 May 2016, this total number rose to a current caseload of approximately 
902 (Smith, 2016). G4S (2016; 2015; 2014) make statistical data available about the 
use of EM and some of the characteristics of monitored people in Scotland, some of 
which is referenced here.  
Court-imposed Restriction of Liberty Orders (RLOs) are the most commonly used form 
of EM order, accounting for 66 per cent of EM cases in 2015 (G4S, 2016). In the 12 
month period from 1 January - 31 December 2015 a total of 1,806 new RLOs were 
imposed, most commonly for a period of 3 or 4 months (G4S, 2016). The majority of 
RLOs involve restriction to a designated place (i.e. home curfew), with the imposition of 
only one order involving an ‘away from’ restriction from a place. ‘Away from’ restrictions 
can be imposed for up to 24 hours and they can be imposed concurrently with curfew 
restrictions to a place. Curfews can only be imposed for up to a maximum of 12 hours 
a day. The most common offences resulting in the imposition of an RLO are diverse in 
nature. In 2015, these included offences under the Criminal Justice and Licencing 
(Scotland) Act 2010, assault, and theft, as well as offences under the Sexual Offences 
(Scotland) Act 2009, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, the Social Security Administration 
Act 1992, fraud, arson, wilful fire-raising, and wasting police time. Even though they are 
the most common form of EM modality in Scotland, Restriction of Liberty Orders are not 
widely recommended to sentencers by criminal justice social workers. In 2014-2015, of 
the 30,838 criminal justice social work reports submitted, only 551 had an RLO as a 
preferred sentencing option. 
Similarly, in 2015, 1,426 new Home Detention Curfews (HDCs) were imposed (G4S, 
2016). The use of EM as a condition or requirement of another type of order is rare. In 
2015, 9 new restricted movement requirements after breach of a Community Payback 
Order were imposed, and during the same period, 17 parole releases with an EM 
condition were made (G4S, 2016). In relation to children and youth with a movement 
restriction condition as a component of their ISMS intensive support package, in 2015, 
27 movement restriction conditions were made (G4S, 2016). 
Figure 2 Restriction of Liberty Order (RLO) length: number of orders by number 
of months, in Scotland from 1 January – 31 December 2015 
 
Source: G4S (2016). 
8
107
251
465
417
115
270
31 40
49
12 5
36
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
<1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 18 
  
Statistical data about the length of EM orders report measures of time differently, with 
the length of RLOs reported in months, and the length of HDCs reported in days.  
During the period 1 January – 31 December 2015, the most commonly imposed length 
of HDC licence was 30-60 days, and the maximum length is 180 days (G4S, 2016). 
Figure 2.2 shows that the number of HDC’s granted decreased in 2015, compared to 
2014.  
Figure 3 Home Detention Curfew (HDC) length: number of orders by number of 
days, in Scotland between 1 January – 31 December in 2014 and 2015 
 
Source: G4S (2016; 2015). 
2.4 Scope and limitations within the Scottish research   
There are a few issues and features of the Scottish research which warrant 
acknowledgement to contextualise and bound its contributions and scope. These relate 
to the Scottish sample in terms of size and composition, bounding of the interview 
questions, as well as availability of data. This research does not encompass a focus on 
confidential operational matters (for example, details of procurement between the 
government and private companies), nor is it an evaluation (in the formal sense of the 
word) of the practices of any service provider or organisation. 
The sample size of 30 interviews per country was a target set in agreement with the 
other research partners at the outset of this project. However, it is acknowledged that 
an interview sample of 30 participants is relatively small, albeit one that is, arguably, 
appropriate and proportionate in the context of a small jurisdiction, in combination with 
the information yielded by the other methods and data used in this study. In this report 
and related research outputs, we, as authors and researchers, do not claim to provide 
an all-inclusive account of the views of all actors involved in EM and Scottish criminal 
justice more broadly. The Scottish research sample contains, for example, an interview 
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with one practitioner from Police Scotland and one member of the Parole Board for 
Scotland. Each practitioner perspective is valid and valuable; however, interview 
participants have provided insights from their professional expertise and experiences, 
and their comments are not offered here as official representations of their institution’s 
viewpoint on a given issue or research finding. 
Secondly, this research sample does not include monitored people, their families and 
other cohabitants, or victims of crime (and these groups are not mutually exclusive). 
Ethnographic observations in the Scottish research focused on electronic monitoring 
practices in the field; interview questions were not asked of people present in the 
households visited. However, lived experiences and first person perspectives are 
important in gaining a fuller and deeper understanding of electronic monitoring, which 
is why here and elsewhere (see Graham and McIvor, 2015) we recommend that in-
depth research, especially independent research, and other mechanisms for input and 
consultation with people from these groups should be considered and initiated as a 
matter of urgency.  
Thirdly, it is acutely acknowledged in Scotland, as well as other countries in this five 
jurisdiction comparison, that our capacity to offer empirical findings and 
recommendations about the effectiveness and impact of electronic monitoring is limited 
by a lack of publicly available information. Some descriptive statistical data, for example, 
about numbers of EM orders, is available in the Scottish context, a proportion of which 
is referenced here. However, more data, especially statistical data, needs to be 
collected and made publicly available. In particular, more information is needed about 
monitored people both during and after an EM order, as well as workforce, institutional 
and economic data relating to the staffing, operation and costs of EM. Some of these 
issues and limitations raised in this sub-section are related. It is difficult to make 
conclusions about, for example, the effectiveness or impact of EM on compliance and 
desistance in a study where monitored people have not been interviewed and other 
sources of data about recidivism is rudimentary.  
We have argued elsewhere (Graham and McIvor, 2015: 117) that ‘the effectiveness of 
electronic monitoring must be understood as contingent and complex’, and that others 
such as Gainey (2014) ‘rightly warns against the extremes of simplistically constructing 
electronically monitored punishment as a panacea or as an abject failure in response to 
the problem of crime’. Any evidence, experiences or recommendations within this 
research need to be understood in light of such caveats and warnings. There is a still a 
lot that is not known about the uses and impact of electronic monitoring, in Scotland and 
internationally. In making recommendations about potential changes for the future, the 
multi-faceted implications of these changes, if enacted, cannot be fully accounted for 
here. 
Section 3: The application of electronic monitoring 
Section 3 highlights a series of research findings about how EM is currently used, 
featuring the perspectives of a range of practitioners who were interviewed in this 
research. It is worth noting at the outset of this section that there are significant 
differences between practitioners in levels of awareness of what is involved in the 
application of electronic monitoring and how the technology works. This, in turn, may 
reflect ideological differences between practitioners in different institutions and areas 
across Scotland. Such differences appear to be influenced by how frequently EM is 
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used by those criminal justice actors, as well as by the perceptions and attitudes of the 
judiciary, prison staff and managers of criminal justice social work teams in a given area. 
In areas where EM orders are commonly used, practitioners demonstrate a moderately 
strong and clear awareness of its uses, including its strengths and limitations. In areas 
where EM orders are not as commonly assessed for, recommended or imposed, 
particularly in relation to RLOs, criminal justice social workers and sheriffs interviewed 
in this research made comments to the effect of “they don’t ask for it/they don’t 
recommend it.” This is further explored in sub-section 3.4. Some participants asked 
questions in research interviews about how EM technology works, which community 
sentences it can be imposed with, who has access to the data about monitored people, 
and about EM order completion rates and breach rates.  
While there might be a knowledge gap among some criminal justice actors, this is not 
because of a current lack of available information about electronic monitoring in 
Scotland. Staff from the private EM services provider G4S regularly offer information 
presentations and tagging demonstrations at practitioner conferences and professional 
development events (e.g., for social workers, sheriffs), as well as inviting key 
practitioners to ‘Open Nights’ at the National Electronic Monitoring Centre near 
Glasgow, to promote clearer awareness of the uses of EM in Scotland. Research 
bulletins with descriptive statistics about EM are available annually (see G4S, 2016; 
2015; 2014). Similarly, policymakers from Scottish Government Community Justice 
division in collaboration with others in cognate organisations (e.g., Social Work 
Scotland) have hosted multi-disciplinary practitioner information and consultation 
sessions across the nation in 2015 and 2016.  
3.1 Objectives: Why do we tag people? 
All participants interviewed in this research were asked ‘what are the purposes of 
electronic monitoring?’ Research participants identify a diverse variety of intended 
objectives, from deterrence to avoiding the harms and costs of incarceration. The most 
common answers centre on reducing the use of prison, through diversion using a 
community penalty, or through decarceration by early release from prison. Some of the 
objectives and purposes raised by participants are complementary and some sit in 
tension with others, in that seeking to achieve one objective or purpose may indirectly 
frustrate or hinder the pursuit of another.  
Several interview participants were asked if there is consensus about the uses of EM 
and why we tag people, in terms of consensus among their peers, and between different 
types of criminal justice actors and organisations? The most common response was the 
view that there is a current lack of consensus. One sheriff answers by saying “No, I’d 
say there are diverse views, within sheriffs and courts, and between others as well … 
there is some consensus of an RLO being seen as nearer to an alternative to prison 
than unpaid work” (Interview 19, Sheriff). A criminal justice social worker responds with 
a similar view, “I think there is a huge variance of perceptions of what it’s for … I think if 
you were to ask a hundred social workers you would probably get quite a varied idea” 
(Interview 4, Criminal Justice Social Worker). 
Members of the judiciary are more likely to raise the retributive element of restricting 
someone’s liberty as a punishment for their crime, serving a symbolic function to fulfil 
community expectations that justice is seen to be done. One sheriff explains: “I’m a fan 
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of Restriction of Liberty Orders and sometimes I use it in a punitive way as an alternative 
for sending people to jail” (Interview 18, Sheriff).  
Some criminal justice social workers and G4S Scotland staff highlight factors which 
coalesce around desistance and community reintegration, suggesting that EM enables 
monitored people to keep and live in their own home, to maintain relationships with 
family and friends, to study or work and retain their employment, and take part in 
community-based programmes and activities in ways which would not be possible if 
they were incarcerated. In a subtle but important distinction, very few of those 
interviewed speak about EM as rehabilitative, or they criticise it as lacking on those very 
grounds.  
Several interviewees raise critical questions about the capacity of current radio-
frequency (RF) tagging and curfews to motivate compliance and reduce re-offending, 
whereas others hold the view that it is currently adequate in achieving these things. By 
contrast, the objective of risk management to reduce re-offending features in several 
interviews regarding the prospect of introducing GPS tagging and tracking. Interviewees 
were quick to point out that GPS EM does not necessarily protect victims and the 
community, because monitored people can remove the tag and it does not control or 
stop offending behaviour. However, several interviewees support the view that there are 
cases where GPS EM and exclusion zones (‘away from’ restrictions) should be used as 
one mechanism for risk management nested within a wider package of supervision of 
particular types of offenders, namely those convicted of sexual offences and domestic 
abuse offences. The perceived strengths and benefits, as well as limitations and 
challenges, of using electronic monitoring are discussed in the next two sub-sections, 
and these are closely related to understanding the objectives and purposes of EM, with 
some overlap between them. 
3.1.1 Perceived strengths, opportunities and benefits of using EM 
There are complexities inherent within discussions of the ‘benefits’ of electronic 
monitoring, because this broaches the question of beneficial for whom? For example, 
some of the perceived strengths and benefits mentioned here, offered from the 
perspective of diverse types of practitioners, may or may not be met with assent from 
monitored people. In this study, a relatively broad view is taken in analysing participants’ 
perspectives of the potential benefits and strengths, as well as limitations and 
challenges, of EM.  
One vein of discussions of the perceived benefits relates to active participation in 
positive family and other social relationships, with some participants recognising that, 
where these exist, EM is likely to be less damaging than separation through confinement 
in custody because it enables families to stay connected and the monitored person to 
continue to take part in family life. In discussing early release from prison, one interview 
participant accentuates the benefits and opportunities for men in the process of 
reintegration: 
I can see the point of having them [prisoners] outside in the community serving 
part of their sentence because it’s preparing them for release … It’s letting them 
engage with their family again and their kids, it’s letting them see their kids coming 
out from school, they can do homework with their children, the whole aspect of 
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being a father I suppose they’re going to benefit from, and I think the families 
benefit from that as well (Interview 28, Scottish Prison Service). 
More broadly, this fits with the extant literature on desistance from crime and 
reintegration which affirms the value of maintaining positive (including safe) family 
relationships and social connections, and incorporating these roles in a positive 
personal sense of identity (e.g., father or mother), in the process of leaving crime behind 
(see Graham and McIvor, 2015; Hucklesby, 2008).  
Another, related vein of discussions highlights the opportunity to leave negative 
relationships and pro-criminal influences behind. Numerous interview participants from 
a diverse range of work roles spoke about the opportunity to use the tag as a visible 
reason for not being able to go out and engage in criminal behaviour and not being 
available to associate with the people they used to engage in such activities with. One 
practitioner called the ‘excuse’ of EM a potential “protective element for them” (Interview 
23, Parole Board for Scotland) in giving young offenders a credible reason for not being 
able to go out at night, with a view to breaking away from established peer associations 
that led to their criminal justice involvement. Another echoed the same sentiments: 
It’s about … giving the people an opportunity to prevent themselves from having 
to hang about with the same group of people that they were hanging about with at 
the time they got into trouble, if that makes sense? [laughs] So you know, whereas 
before, you know, their pals would phone them up and go “right, come on, we’re 
going out to the pub tonight and blah-blah” and they would go “aye let’s go, that’s 
fine”, now they go “well I cannae [can’t], I’ve got this tag on” so it’s giving them the 
perfect excuse to change their social circle if they like or, you know, to make that 
break from a group of people that maybe werenae [weren’t] having the best 
influence on them (Interview 12, G4S). 
Various practitioners offered anonymous real examples from their professional 
experiences of having motivational conversations with service users, particularly youth 
and young adults, about using their time ‘on the tag’ to settle into routines that do not 
involve criminal behaviour and associated contexts.  
In a different vein of discussions, some interviewees draw attention to the surveillant 
and restrictive penal functions of electronic monitoring for the perceived benefit of 
prioritising public protection and community safety. One interview participant 
characterises EM as offering some level of surveillance and control in the community, 
“there are a lot of people for whom a custodial sentence is not necessary, but some kind 
of control or punishment or monitoring is relevant” (Interview 2, Police Scotland). Other 
interview participants link the community punishment and control functions of EM as 
having the capacity to “strengthen the credibility” (Interview 4, Criminal Justice Social 
Worker) of EM as a community sanction. A different criminal justice social worker 
highlights the value of “public accountability” in using EM as a restriction of liberty 
(Interview 3, Criminal Justice Social Worker).  
3.1.2 Perceived challenges and limitations of using EM  
A few different concerns and challenges are acknowledged by interview participants. 
Participants demonstrate a mindfulness of the size and visibility of the EM tag, the 
frustrations and pressures of the home curfew, and the recognition that, for some, being 
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tagged and curfewed is a stigmatising and difficult experience. However, the difficulties 
associated with EM tend to be juxtaposed as preferable when compared with the 
difficulties and stigma of being imprisoned.  
Some participants are quick to acknowledge that EM is a punishment, and in its stand-
alone form, it may not achieve much more than that. Questions and concerns are raised 
about the suitability of imposing a structured and strict curfew regime without integrated 
supervision with people who have a history of non-compliance. For example, one 
participant contends that EM is “less suitable where people have a demonstrably chaotic 
lifestyle and a poor record of compliance with court measures which unfortunately 
includes quite a number of people who have been through the criminal justice process” 
(Interview 2, Police Scotland). Another interviewee links the issue of lack of suitability 
for people with a chaotic lifestyle and the risk of “setting them up to fail” with the 
challenges EM might pose for the family and household relational dynamics in such 
circumstances, especially if they felt they could not ask the person to leave (Interview 
4, Criminal Justice Social Worker). 
The potential collateral consequences of tagging and curfews for families and other 
cohabitants were raised in several interviews. Firstly, at the most serious end of the 
spectrum, several participants raise questions and concerns about the need to fully and 
regularly assess for the risk of domestic abuse in imposing a home curfew. Secondly, 
some participants highlight differences in the length and intensity of an EM order: 
“families might be able to sustain four weeks but they might not be able to sustain four 
months overall” (Interview 3, Criminal Justice Social Work). The average length of a 
Restriction of Liberty Order may be three or four months, and RLOs can be imposed for 
up to 12 months at a time. Other participants gave anonymous examples of feedback 
from family members about the challenges and pressures of EM, including “feedback 
from mums of younger offenders who say they felt as if they were taking on the 
responsibility of the curfew because they were, you know, literally hoping that the young 
person was in at seven o'clock, and then they were on tenterhooks if they were talking 
about leaving the house during curfew et cetera” (Interview 11, G4S). The findings and 
recommendations of this study urge the need for more research in this area, in terms of 
listening to the full spectrum of family members’ experiences.  
Interestingly, a more systemic and social challenge or issue which was largely missing 
from participant discussions in this study is the important question of net-widening and 
critical reflections on the extent to which EM is used in Scotland as an alternative to 
prison, compared to the extent to which it is used in addition to a burgeoning custodial 
estate. 
3.2 Target groups: Who should electronic monitoring be used with? 
This sub-section offers a summary of participant perspectives in response to questions 
and conversations about the targeted use of electronic monitoring. As indicated earlier 
in this report, electronic monitoring in Scotland is available at a number of points in the 
criminal justice process. It is used principally as a high tariff community based penalty 
(RLO) and as a mechanism for early release from custody (on HDC) for short-term 
prisoners (that is, those serving prison sentences of less than four years). Courts 
currently impose RLOs on people who have committed a diverse range of crimes and 
offences, as illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 4 demonstrates the versatility of EM, implying 
that current uses of EM are not exclusive in the targeting of particular groups of people. 
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Figure 4 Examples of main types of crimes/offences for which Restriction of 
Liberty Orders were the main penalty imposed in Scotland, 2013-2014* 
 
Source: Adapted from Scottish Government (2014: 40). 
* Note: Figure 4 does not provide a comprehensive list of all crimes and offences for 
which a Restriction of Liberty Order was imposed as the main penalty for people with a 
charge proven in Scotland in 2013-2014.  
In initiating discussions about more focused uses of EM with particular groups, in its 
2013 Consultation on electronic monitoring (Scottish Government, 2013a) the Scottish 
Government sought views on the potential introduction and uses of GPS tagging and 
tracking technology: 
 to monitor sex offenders; 
 in voluntary pilots for persistent offenders; 
 to protect victims of domestic abuse; 
 for all electronically monitored orders. 
The development of EM in Scotland following the Consultation is currently being taken 
forwards by a Working Group on EM established by the Scottish Government which is 
expected to report and make recommendations to the Cabinet Secretary for Justice in 
mid-2016. In addition, a few groups are worthy of specific comment here, namely sex 
offenders and women offenders.  
One of the approaches to the management of sex offenders in Scotland involves Multi-
Agency Public Protection Arrangements, which are commonly referred to as MAPPA. 
Where EM is imposed as a component of MAPPA supervision, a sex offender may be 
restricted to a place and/or restricted away from specific places. The capacity to actively 
monitor the latter is somewhat limited by the capacity of RF-based EM technology, 
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which does not ‘track’ movements, and can only detect presence or absence of a tagged 
person within an established zone where there is a home monitoring unit (HMU). 
Furthermore, for a small proportion of sex offenders managed within MAPPA who are 
assessed as presenting the highest level of risk, the use of electronic monitoring may 
be combined with other restrictions and surveillance measures, including ‘CCTV in their 
properties or a supervising officer physically with them 24/7 … for these offenders, 
electronic monitoring will be part of an existing supervisory condition’ (Scottish 
Government, 2013a: 20). Participants in this study draw attention to the importance of 
sound risk management practices and the utility of EM in assisting that. 
The other group to feature extensively in participant comments in this study is that of 
women offenders. In Scotland, as in numerous other Western jurisdictions, the female 
prison population has grown significantly over the last 15 years resulting in increasing 
political concern about the imprisonment of women.  In 2011, the Cabinet Secretary for 
Justice appointed an independent Commission on Women Offenders whose remit was 
‘to consider the evidence on how to improve outcomes for women in the criminal justice 
system; to make recommendations for practical measures in this Parliament to reduce 
their reoffending and reverse the recent increase in the female prisoner population’. In 
its resulting report the Commission made 37 recommendations across seven broad 
areas for improving outcomes for women in the criminal justice system and reducing 
their reoffending (Commission on Women Offenders, 2012). Specifically in relation to 
EM, the Commission recommended that the Government examine the potential for EM 
to be made available as a condition of bail as an alternative to a custodial remand. 
Views were sought on this proposal in the Scottish Government consultation on the 
development of EM in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2013a).  
More recently the Scottish Government has reaffirmed its commitment to reducing the 
number of women imprisoned through plans for a reconfigured and scaled down female 
custodial estate with an increased use of community based penalties for women who 
are not deemed to require a period of incarceration. While policy and practice continues 
to develop in this area, participant perceptions in this study suggest they see EM as 
having a prominent role as one mechanism, among others, in seeking to reduce the 
female prison population in Scotland. 
Conversely, one interview participant emphasises their view that EM and curfews, as a 
stand-alone order, are not appropriate for some women offenders as it may increase 
their risk of self-harm: 
For some client groups, service user groups it’s not entirely appropriate, for 
example women I think, well not all women but some women, I think given the high 
degrees of self-harm in some women having them restricted to a place for long 
periods of time potentially increases the risk of self-harm and for men as well 
obviously… We have a women’s service in [place in Scotland] … and I was talking 
to [name removed] the other day, the manager and she was like “no to electronic 
monitoring for women”, and for some women it just, I mean it would increase their 
risk of self-harm most definitely … Some of these women are traumatised and 
damaged you know, experiencing acute trauma, and more therapeutic 
interventions are what’s required to be honest (Interview 10, Criminal Justice 
Social Worker). 
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However, this view was not commonly held by others. Numerous interview participants 
perceived electronic monitoring as being a suitable and even desirable diversionary 
measure to reduce and avoid high rates of women’s imprisonment in Scotland. Access 
to other supports, including gender-specific responses tailored to women, was 
highlighted by some participants – in other words, they did not necessarily continue to 
see EM as a stand-alone measure but one condition among other requirements and 
supports for female offenders. 
3.3 Geographical and institutional differences in uses of EM across Scotland 
Secondary analysis of statistics provided by key stakeholders show some geographical 
and institutional differences in the use of electronically monitored orders across 
Scotland. This is most clearly observed in the differences between courts in the 
frequency with which EM orders are imposed, albeit with the recognition that judicial 
decisions are informed by the recommendations of criminal justice social workers from 
their local authority.  
Some judicial officers and courts across Scotland use Restriction of Liberty Orders (EM 
court orders) frequently, whereas others use them rarely.  
In 2015, some courts imposed RLOs extensively (N = number of orders): Glasgow 
(N=314), Kilmarnock (N=196), Dundee (N=189), Hamilton (N=154), Dunfermline 
(N=147), Livingston (N=110) and Kirkcaldy (102) (G4S, 2016). In comparison, some 
courts barely made use of this sentencing disposition in the same 12 month period, for 
example: Arbroath (N=1), Jedburgh (N=4), Stirling (N=6), Falkirk (N=6), Greenock 
(N=9), Alloa (N=11), Inverness (N=17), Paisley (N=18), and Aberdeen (N=19) (G4S, 
2016). These differences cannot be explained solely on the basis of differences in local 
area population or annual court workload in criminal proceedings.  
In 2015, the rate of RLOs imposed by sheriffs in Glasgow was 256 per cent higher than 
that of their Edinburgh counterparts, with 314 RLOs imposed in Glasgow compared to 
88 RLOs in Edinburgh (G4S, 2016). Some court areas had a marked rise in the use of 
EM orders, for example, in Kilmarnock 60 RLOs were imposed in 2014, and 196 RLOs 
in 2015, which signals a 226 per cent increase in 1 year (G4S, 2016, 2015). Differences 
between sheriffs and courts were commented on in the course of ethnographic 
observations in the field and in interviews, with one criminal justice social worker noting 
“the sheriffs in Glasgow and the sheriffs in Edinburgh are completely different” (Interview 
3) to draw attention to the differences in their uses of EM orders. 
There are some modest institutional differences in the use of HDCs, which involve the 
early release and electronic monitoring of prisoners in the community. In 2015, the 
Scottish prisons which most commonly imposed HDCs were: HMP Barlinnie (N=227), 
HMP Edinburgh (N=172), HMP Perth (N=161), HMP Addiewell (N=139) and HMP Low 
Moss (N=124) (G4S, 2016). In the same year, the prisons which least commonly 
imposed HDCs were: HMP Inverness (N=43), HMP Glenochil (N=46) and HMP 
Greenock (N=65) (G4S, 2016), It appears that institutional differences between prison 
facilities in numbers of HDCs imposed may, to a certain extent at least, correspond with 
the size of the prison facilities, as reflected by average daily prison population. Some of 
the prisons with some of the largest prisoner populations and prisoner admission rates 
per annum, for example, HMP Barlinnie and HMP Edinburgh, are also those granting 
the most HDCs in a 12 month period. By contrast, HMP Glenochil is moderate in the 
 27 
  
size of its overall prisoner population; however, it is a site which is central to managing 
prisoners who may not be eligible for HDC (e.g., prisoners convicted of sexual offences 
and prisoners serving extended sentence orders), which may partly explain why it grants 
less HDCs in a 12 month period. 
Overall, geographical and institutional differences in uses of electronically monitored 
orders across Scotland need to be better understood. The available statistics indicate 
that access to EM is partially dependent on the decision-maker involved. Given that one 
of the uses of electronic monitoring is intended as an alternative to a prison sentence, 
this raises questions of equity and consistency which warrant consideration and 
responses from those tasked with the governance and development of EM in Scotland 
into the future.   
3.4 Assessment of eligibility and suitability 
For RLOs and HDCs, criminal justice social workers and criminal justice social work 
assistants are responsible for assessing the suitability of a person and their nominated 
address, if given a home curfew restriction. In the case of court-imposed orders, this 
assessment information is provided to the judiciary in a review of relevant sentencing 
options which includes recommendations by the criminal justice social worker. In the 
case of early release from prison on HDC licence, this assessment information and 
recommendations are provided to the relevant Scottish Prison Service staff in the prison 
facility in which the applicant is incarcerated. 
In practice, there are differences across Scotland in processes and uses of templates 
to assess and recommend suitability for a Restriction of Liberty Order, as part of a 
review of relevant sentencing options. 
Some members of the judiciary routinely ask for RLOs to be included in pre-sentence 
assessments of the suitability of relevant sentencing options; some ask for it to be 
assessed and written in a separate document; others rarely ask for it to be assessed. 
Similarly, some criminal justice social workers and local authorities automatically or at 
least routinely assess for suitability of a RLO along with other community-based 
sanctions. Conversely, some social workers suggested that they only assess suitability 
for a court-imposed EM order where they are specifically requested to, “I think a lot of 
social workers will only consider it when the sheriffs kind of initiate an assessment” 
(Interview 4, criminal justice social worker). In a different local authority, another criminal 
justice social worker stated that “it’s not used widely” where they work, and that social 
workers “ask for it rarely” and “even if they do recommend it, sometimes sheriffs don’t 
go for it as well” (Interview 10, Criminal Justice Social Worker). 
A few sheriffs expressed their views that some criminal justice social workers avoid 
assessing for it and recommending it because of a perceived ideological opposition to 
EM and private service involvement, and because they are not involved in service 
delivery with monitored people on stand-alone orders: 
Because it’s a privatised order, social workers unionised a bit chippie sometimes, 
they never liked these people [private companies] coming in … But it’s not been 
taken up nearly as well as it should be and the main thing is because it’s never 
recommended.  So you know let’s just take this report I’ve got for tomorrow: this 
young lady’s pregnant, she’s been involved in serious drug stuff blah-blah-blah, 
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they say “oh drug treatment and testing order, community payback order … 
financial penalties, blah-blah-blah analysis and all of that”, it’s called a review of 
relevant sentencing options and it doesn't go anywhere near a Restriction of 
Liberty Order!  So the only way I might get that covered is if I specifically ask for it, 
but even when I specifically ask for it mysteriously they forget to do it (Interview 
18, Sheriff). 
A sheriff who had worked across more than one sheriff court also spoke about the 
differences in willingness to assess suitability between the criminal justice social work 
teams in the two places.  
It depends very much I think on the, how comfortable the social workers are with 
them as well.  In [name of Place A] the criminal justice social work department 
became quite, I think they were quite content with the way that I used them so they 
were willing to work along with them, were willing to do proper assessments as to 
the suitability. In [name of Place B], they don't automatically assess for Restriction 
of Liberty Orders, so unless the sentencer specifically asks for an assessment, it 
won't appear in the criminal justice social work report, which will discourage people 
from imposing them – well you can't impose them unless they’ve been assessed 
as suitable and very few cases in [Place B] have I ever seen a social worker 
suggest a RLO. But I routinely asked for assessments because I thought they 
might be an appropriate way of doing it and therefore if my colleagues aren’t asking 
for those assessments, they’re not being put forward as a suggestion and 
therefore they’re not going to be encouraged to think of them. (Interview 16, 
Sheriff). 
In contrast, a senior criminal justice social worker relayed examples of common 
questions among their staff team about the objectives of electronic monitoring, stating 
that some of the differences in opinion about EM between the judiciary and criminal 
justice social workers might derive from different ideas about its purposes: 
I’ve done a lot of work with a lot of sheriffs in [place] so I know them quite well. But 
one of the things they said, which was really quite enlightening for us, was that 
sometimes they use it purely as a punishment element … they’ve utilised it as a 
punishment so it’s about “this is what I can do to you, I can put you to custody but 
what I’m going to do is I’m going to make you stay in your house for this period of 
time” … So that was a real revelation because nobody had ever said that to us 
before and then the sheriffs went “oh we wondered why you never recommended 
it” [laughs] or made referral, included it. We went “well actually, we didn't see that 
as our, it’s not our role to look at punitive elements”, but it now explains why sheriffs 
on some occasions have imposed electronic monitoring when it’s made absolutely 
no sense to us whatsoever, why would you restrict somebody who goes out during 
the day to offend to be in at night time? [laughs] (Interview 3, Criminal Justice 
Social Worker). 
This criminal justice social worker and others spoke extensively about matching 
sanctions with risk, including risk of reoffending, rather than just imposing a 
standardised punishment. Similarly, another criminal justice social worker suggested 
that, from their perspective, one of the limitations of electronic monitoring is that “it does 
not reduce re-offending” (Interview 10). Geographic diversity in assessment of suitability 
for court-imposed EM warrants further consideration in terms of ensuring a coherent 
 29 
  
amount of consistency and equity across Scotland. The issues involved in inter-agency 
work regarding assessment of risk with regard to address suitability are discussed in 
Section 5 of this report. 
A member of the Parole Board for Scotland interviewed in this research spoke of their 
experience in ways which bear some similarities to the perceptions of sheriffs, 
suggesting that some criminal justice social workers do not tend to assess for and 
recommend EM: 
Interviewer: So if the social worker hasn't raised the possibility of electronic 
monitoring, you could still ask for an assessment? 
Participant: We do quite often do. Quite often it’s not done and we will say we’ll 
defer it and we’d like an assessment done for this, yes. Or the social worker 
sometimes refers it but hasn't got the assessment done and we’ll say “yes that’s 
fine” but come back to make sure it’s manageable (Interview 23, Parole Board for 
Scotland). 
The reasons underlying the apparent differences in perspective and practices between 
some decision-makers in authorising agencies and some criminal justice social workers 
as assessors and supervising officers warrant further reflection and discussion. If there 
has been a historical or if there is a current hesitancy among some criminal justice social 
workers to recommend electronic monitoring, the reasons for this need to be heard and 
responded to, as their professional views and culture are relevant to future 
developments of electronic monitoring in Scotland.  
3.5 Consent 
Individuals who are made subject to EM in Scotland are required to sign a form 
indicating their consent to having the equipment installed, both in their residence and 
on their person. Signed consent is also required of the premises holder (premises owner 
or person named on the rental lease agreement), if this is not the monitored person. In 
the case of children and young people under 16 years of age, consent is required both 
from the young person and their parent or a responsible adult. In the case of ‘away from’ 
restrictions involving victims, consent is required from the victim to have a box installed 
in their property. Formal consent is often sought at the point immediately prior to the 
equipment being installed. 
There is extensive consensus across participants that consent is, and should continue 
to be, required from the monitored person and the premises holder (if this is not the 
monitored person) for home-based curfew restrictions.  
Overall, most participants are clear and succinct in stating that they support the current 
arrangements of seeking the consent of the monitored person and the premises holder, 
if that is not the monitored person, retaining the mechanisms for consent to be 
withdrawn at any time. One participant offered the view that, “if you impose something 
upon somebody who hasn’t given their consent, then a resentment and the issues that 
flow from that might be too challenging to manage” (Interview 1, Criminal Justice Social 
Worker). 
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The following case study offers an example from fieldwork observations to illustrate the 
fact that maintaining the informed consent of monitored people is not always a straight 
forward process. This case study raises questions of how dynamic issues of consent 
can arise during the period of monitoring (i.e., after the initial installation process) in 
relation to violations and breach decisions.  
Case study from the field: Consent and compliance in investigating a violation 
alert 
A field officer was accompanied by a researcher to the house of a man on a Restriction 
of Liberty Order to investigate a denied absence alert. The National Electronic 
Monitoring Centre (NEMC) system had been registering alerts that his tag was 
intermittently absent for periods of a few minutes at a time. He denied that he was 
absent in these instances, and stated that he had been smoking at the front door of the 
property – his parent’s house, who had consented to the EM equipment in the house – 
while standing just inside the threshold. The field officer discovered that the home 
monitoring unit (HMU) box had been installed in close proximity to a large TV in the 
lounge room downstairs. He asked the monitored person about why it was installed 
there, and the monitored person said that he “was not really sure”, but he expressed an 
emphatic view that it should not be moved and re-installed upstairs.  
 
The field officer explained that the installation of the HMU box next to the TV would 
affect its accuracy and increase the likelihood of false alerts for absences. He asked the 
monitored person if he could move the HMU box to a better location, which would 
involve an install process, including a range test. The monitored person said repeatedly 
that he was not sure about this. The field officer carefully explained, in detail, his options 
and their consequences regarding whether or not he consented to an install procedure 
being done, which was necessary for the HMU box to be moved for it to work properly. 
The monitored person asked if he could go upstairs to speak with one of his parents, 
which he did. He returned and explained that he would not consent to an install being 
done on that night because of the loud beeping and the need to walk around the 
perimeter of each room. The reason for rejecting the field officer’s request related to the 
fact that the monitored person’s child was asleep upstairs at the time, and that it was 
important to him that the child did not know he was tagged. 
The field officer re-iterated the potential consequences of continuing to accrue alerts as 
violations in the system, and of refusing to consent to an re-install being done, as this 
could constitute as a ‘failure to comply’ violation, meaning he risked being returned to 
court. The monitored person said that he understood the consequences of this, stating 
that he would “rather risk going to court” than risk his child finding out that he was 
tagged. The monitored person and the field officer discussed the wording of the visit 
report, and the monitored person signed it. The monitored person continued to wear the 
tag, and the HMU box stayed in the original location next to the TV. These events were 
documented by the field officer and relayed to the NEMC system, and the discretion for 
making decisions about violation alerts was to be left to the issuing court as the 
authorising agency of his order. 
Only a few participants explicitly expressed the view that family member cohabitants 
should be asked for their consent in instances of home-based curfew restrictions (where 
those family members are not the premises holder).  
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The welfare of cohabitants, family or otherwise, was deemed by participants to be a 
relevant consideration for the issuing authority (prison, court, parole board) in terms of 
risk management and assessing the suitability of the address. However, the need to 
gain their formal consent before or during the process of installation was not raised or 
recommended by many participants. Among the few participants that did raise it, it was 
framed in terms of family members’ rights and the impact of EM on them.  
Some of the judiciary felt that they already take into account the wellbeing of family 
cohabitants as important in their decision-making to impose an electronically monitored 
order, but were either opposed to or undecided about whether the formal consent of 
family should be sought. 
We certainly take account of cohabitants views because as you’ll know, we have 
to get a background report before we can impose the order, and I think the social 
workers who write these reports are very aware of potential difficulties in having 
couples forced, forcibly confined to the same house especially if there’s been, you 
know, difficulties between them.  So whether it should be a formal requirement I’m 
not quite sure, I would need to think about it, but in reality we do usually, we’re 
alerted to any potential difficulties that might arise (Interview 20, Sheriff). 
There is a need for further consideration of the processes for seeking the informed 
consent of victims and premises holders of properties where an ‘away from’ restriction 
is imposed 
G4S staff and some sheriffs mentioned the use of ‘away from’ restrictions where an 
exclusion zone is established around a property and monitored 24 hours a day. These 
restrictions are not made very often in Scotland. However, recent examples include 
‘away from’ restrictions being made as a component of a Restriction of Liberty Order, 
and HMU boxes being put into business properties, including supermarkets and fast 
food chains, which have been the location of criminal activities.  
Where participants mention the use of ‘away from’ restrictions, all were clear in stating 
that the premises holder, especially as these are usually victim(s), should consent to 
this. However, it was suggested by a few participants that, in the case of businesses, 
seeking consent on the day that an order has been imposed is difficult with businesses, 
whose staff change shifts and whose management may or may not inform those on duty 
in the afternoon or at night when G4S staff arrive that they are coming (bearing in mind 
that installation procedures involve conducting a range test). Some participants suggest 
that the sheriff or authorising agency imposing the order with ‘away from’ restrictions, in 
liaison with the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, should go to greater lengths 
to consistently ensure that the people and properties where these restrictions are being 
imposed are aware and give their informed consent in advance that this will occur, 
before G4S staff arrive to seek formal consent and conduct installation procedures. 
The guy that’s restricted away from Macdonald’s - Macdonald’s had no idea we 
were coming, so it would be good if these people were made aware of one, that 
we’re turning up and two that we need to put equipment in and then we can explain 
obviously fully what’s expected (Interview 6, G4S staff). 
The sensitivities of seeking consent are likely to be even greater in instances where an 
‘away from’ restriction and box installation is required in the property of a victim of 
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offences involving domestic abuse or other issues of violence or stalking. The timing 
and processes for seeking this consent warrant further reflection in Scotland. 
The only interview participants to highlight the question of whether consent is, or should 
be, required from the EM services provider, G4S staff, are those participants who work 
for G4S and a criminal justice social work participant. Their comments tend to be framed 
in terms of risk management and duty of care. 
Would we want to get G4S or the provider to?  I think they would. I think if the 
assessment is sound, they should be working with them whether they wanted to 
or not (Interview 1, Criminal Justice Social Worker). 
Staff are told, you know, always their safety comes first you know. As a business 
I think we can withdraw our kind of, we can withdraw all consent to monitoring as 
well if we feel, you usually find that kind of a wee word of warning from whatever 
body, be it the prisons or the courts or whatever, or maybe just send in two staff 
the next night and just make them aware that their behaviour was unacceptable 
and it usually works here (Interview 8, G4S staff). 
If an EM field officer encounters sufficient risk to withdraw their consent, and evacuate 
or refuse to enter a property or work with a monitored person, the reasons for this are 
relayed to NEMC staff and documented. If it is due to threats to their wellbeing and 
aggressive behaviour, the monitored person is, in most cases, made aware of this and 
informed of the consequences. Threats and aggressive behaviour to field officers is a 
violation, which may result in breach. Issues of risk to field officers, and their safety and 
consent, are discussed further in Section 5 of this report. 
3.6 Creativity and flexibility in current uses of electronic monitoring  
Mike Nellis (2016a, 2016b; 2014) has already observed that there is scope for electronic 
monitoring to be used more strategically and creatively in Scotland. The findings of this 
study demonstrate that, overall, the uses of EM here can be characterised as simple 
and straightforward. Curfews tend to be standardised, and only altered from a 7:00pm 
– 7:00am regime where there is a reason to do so, for example, employment. Current 
uses of EM appear to be relatively sound in achieving objectives like restriction of liberty, 
diversion through acting as an alternative to prison, or modest decarceration through 
early release from prison for those who are eligible.  
Despite limited examples of creative and tailored uses of EM, a few interview 
participants have suggested that this is changing. For court-imposed EM orders, some 
sheriffs in Scotland are known to use RLOs in a flexible and graduated way that 
motivates and incentivises compliance.  
Some sheriffs have used a sort of staged Restriction of Liberty order whereby it’ll 
be twelve hours for the first month, and then if there are no breaches reported, it’ll 
come down to eight hours for the second month, and then again if there are no 
breaches it’ll come down so it is very flexible (Interview 20, Sheriff). 
Restriction of Liberty Orders are very flexible at the moment. You can set different 
hours of curfew every day, if you wish… On the positive side, we can also use the 
approach of incentivised compliance. It is like a staged RLO, for example, a curfew 
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of 12 hours a day for the first stage, and then down to 8 hours a day if they are 
compliant (Interview 19, Sheriff). 
Reflections and recommendations on how to further develop electronic monitoring in 
Scotland are offered in the conclusion of this report, with complementary analysis and 
recommendations provided in the comparative research report (see Hucklesby et al., 
2016b).  
Section 4: Equipment and technology 
The electronic monitoring technology and equipment which has been used in Scotland 
over the past 15 years (2002 to 2016) is radio frequency (RF) tagging technology. 
Section 4 briefly describes the equipment involved, as well as providing a detailed 
description of the installation process. 
4.1 Description of the equipment 
The RF EM equipment used in Scotland is designed and manufactured by G4S 
Monitoring Technologies. It consists of two devices: the Personal Identification Device 
(PID) tag which is secured around the ankle and the Home Monitoring Unit (HMU) which 
is installed at the specified address. The PID contains a short range radio transmitter 
which sends a radio signal at random intervals of between one and ten seconds to any 
HMU which is within receiving range. When the monitoring equipment is installed, the 
field officer will perform a range test by instructing the monitored person to walk around 
all of the allowable areas of the property. Signals emitted by the PID enable to HMU to 
determine the range setting needed to detect signals from the PID whenever the person 
is within the specified curfew area. In late 2015, it was estimated that the RF equipment 
costs approximately £71.70 (€100.77) for a PID tag, and £400 (€562.15) for a HMU box. 
The RF tag is called a ‘PID’, a personal identification device. It is secured round the 
ankle (except in extenuating circumstances where this is not possible), and it is 
waterproof and cannot be removed without detection. An installation tool is used which 
simultaneously locks the strap around the monitored person’s ankle and activates the 
PID’s electronics in a single action. The signal the PID emits to the HMU includes the 
serial number of the PID and its status (battery level, functionality, evidence of 
tampering).The strap contains a fibre optic cable which transmits a light signal from one 
side of the PID to the other which is interrupted if the strap is cut, creating a ‘tamper 
flag’ to alert the service provider that a tamper has occurred. The strap strength is also 
designed so that in the event of an emergency (such as the PID becoming attached to 
machinery) a clip failure would occur and the PID would be released. The telephone 
number to contact the service provider is inscribed on the PID should the monitored 
person need to do so (this, presumably, also enables those who find discarded PIDs to 
contact G4S to return them). The batteries in the PID tags last approximately 12 months. 
There is a warning about battery life that appears after 10 months alerting the EM 
services provider that it will need to be replaced. 
The RF box which accompanies the tag is called a ‘home monitoring unit’ or HMU. It is 
installed in the specified premises, usually the monitored person’s home, and receives 
radio signals from the PID to enable it to determine whether the monitored person is 
present. The information received is processed and transmitted to the monitoring 
system. It relies on a SIM card and mobile phone coverage from the network provider 
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O2. The HMU contains two buttons and a handset. The blue button is pressed by the 
monitored person to receive an incoming call from the monitoring centre (for example, 
to investigate a violation or a ‘home all day’ alert) and can also be used by the monitored 
person to contact the monitoring centre. A red button on the HMU can be used to contact 
the emergency services. 
4.2 Installation process of the equipment 
There are slight differences in the installation process, depending on the type of order 
or licence a person is on. Most field officers conduct field visits and installations as lone 
workers, unless there is a specific reason (i.e., risk to the field officer, or anticipation 
that a particular individual might make an allegation or complaint about the conduct of 
a lone field officer) for them to conduct an installation with two field officers present. 
Only female field officers are allowed to touch the tag or the person of a female 
monitored person. Equipment installations are conducted during curfew hours and 
before midnight on the first day of the order or licence. 
During observations of field officers, the following process of installation has been 
observed for people whose order involves a curfew with a restriction to the home for a 
specified period of time: 
 Paperwork is pre-prepared by the field officer in the car before entering the property; 
 National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC) ‘book on’: while in the car, the 
field officer ‘books on’ before leaving the car by ringing the NEMC, stating the time, 
name of the staff member and monitored person, their address, and the nature of 
the procedure prior to entering the property; 
 Lone worker security device ‘book on’: field officers wear a device around their 
neck on a lanyard that looks like an ID tag, but has lone worker security features 
embedded in it. The device contains a silent ‘panic button’ style alert that, in the 
event that they press it, will start recording all audio information and will record their 
location. This information will be relayed to a response centre in Ireland, who can 
hear everything but cannot interact with the worker. It will also send an alert to the 
NEMC in Glasgow. Field officers ‘book on’ to this device, by pressing a certain button 
on it and speaking into it by stating their name and that of anyone else present with 
them (e.g., the researcher or other escorted visitors), the address they are about to 
enter and the time. The information is stored securely in Ireland; 
 Equipment: Only the equipment needed for the induction procedure is placed in a 
large black bag and taken into the property. (It should be noted that neither the bag, 
the vehicle not the field officer’s clothing visually identify them as being from G4S: 
indeed, field officers often conduct in-vehicle paperwork a short distance from 
premises they are visiting to avoid being seen by neighbours);  
 At the entry to the property, the field officer introduces themselves as being from 
G4S, and will not disclose much until they are with the person subject to the order. 
The person’s date of birth and sighting of personal identification (ID) is requested 
at the outset to verify that the right individual is being inducted and installed; 
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- In addition to this, if a person is on a HDC or on Parole, they need to show a 
copy of their licence and state their prison number; if subject to an RLO they 
are asked to show a copy of the order. 
- If the person is a child or young person under the age of 16 years old with a 
Movement Restriction Condition (MRC) of an Intensive Support and 
Monitoring Service (ISMS) order, a responsible adult must be present during 
the installation process. 
 The monitored person is given a G4S information booklet that is specifically 
designed with information that corresponds to the type of order that they have been 
given. This states in writing the information that they are also told verbally during the 
induction; 
 The field officer reads through and clearly explains the Standard Agreement 
Declaration, including clarification of the time of their curfew and the end date of 
their order, and then asks if the monitored person has any questions.  
- It is explained that G4S field officers can visit them during curfew hours up 
until midnight, and that they will not be contacted in advance to be notified 
that someone is going to visit. However, G4S staff will not visit during non-
curfew hours, which are usually during the day.  
- It is also explained that G4S NEMC staff may ring the Home Monitoring Unit 
(HMU) box and that they are obliged to answer this; however, the calls will be 
for a reason, e.g., if there is an issue such as a violation or a ‘home all day’ 
alert.  
- The monitored person is informed as to what constitutes a violation, and 
told that it will be the decision of the court, the Scottish Prison Service or the 
Children’s Hearings Panel, as the authorising agency, if they violate or breach 
the conditions of their order.  
- The monitored person is informed that, if they are on a court order (e.g. an 
RLO), and they wish to change their address, G4S staff can request a 
change of address on their behalf through the courts on one occasion during 
their order and, after that, they must get their lawyer to request this through 
the courts. All authorised changes of address must notify G4S the same day 
that the Court approves them, so that the equipment can be moved and a re-
install process can be followed. If the monitored person is on a prison-issued 
order or they are on parole, they must get the approval of the authorising 
agency for any change of address. 
- If the monitored person is the premises holder (which means the property 
owner, or a named signatory to the rental lease), they sign the Standard 
Agreement Declaration. If the monitored person is not the premises holder, 
the Declaration must be signed by both the monitored person and the 
premises holder prior to or during the installation to authorise the installation 
of equipment in their property. 
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 The field officer has certain sections or fields of a separate form called the Visit 
Report that they complete in handwriting during the installation process. The 
monitored person is asked to provide two passwords that will be used in any phone 
calls through the HMU box with the NEMC to verify it is them;  
 The monitored person is asked what type of power they have and who the electricity 
services provider is for their property, and they are asked to agree that they will 
ensure a continuous supply of power for the duration of the order. It is also explained 
that the premises holder/electricity account holder will be eligible for a refund of the 
amount of electricity used by the HMU box upon the completion/end of the order (at 
a rate of 1p per day);  
 The person’s ankle is measured with a measuring tape, so that the right length and 
size of strap is installed. The PID fitting tool (red plastic tool) is used to install the 
Personal Identification Device (PID) tag, then the field officer holds a PDA device 
next to the PID to check it is working. The monitored person is shown the phone 
number on their tag and told that it is the phone number for the NEMC, and that they 
can ring it if they need to talk to someone there. They are instructed that if, in the 
event of an emergency, they are taken to hospital or need to take an immediate 
family member to hospital during curfew hours, they need to get a doctor or nurse to 
ring that number on their tag when they arrive at the hospital to confirm that they are 
there and to ring that number again at the point when they are leaving the hospital; 
 The field officer walks around the house and determines the best place to install 
the Home Monitoring Unit (HMU) box. It needs to be installed relatively centrally. 
There are particular places and proximities to other household items that are 
inappropriate for it to be installed because they will interfere with its signal. Tamper 
proof tape is placed over the power point where the HMU box is plugged in, and the 
monitored person is instructed that no one should move, unplug or lift up the box, or 
this will register as a HMU tamper and the tape will have warning marks appear on 
it if it has been tampered with. They are told that the box has ‘tilt’ technology, and 
will alert the NEMC if it is picked up, unplugged or moved. The monitored person is 
also told that they are obliged to ensure there is electricity to the property at all times: 
if there is a power failure or the electricity cuts out during their curfew, the box has a 
battery and will continue to monitor them, and they can top up their power when their 
curfew ends. If the property is in an area that does not have mobile phone coverage, 
a landline has to be installed as the HMU box works using a SIM card; 
 The person does a range test walk around of the perimeters or corners of every 
room and walk-in area (including walk-in cupboards) in the property. The HMU box 
beeps loudly during this time as it registers the range of the walk around. The field 
officer observes and gives directions throughout this process. In properties where 
there is a bath, the person runs water to a depth where it covers their ankle and has 
to hold their ankle and the PID tag (which is waterproof) under the water for a minute 
or so to ensure that this registers during the range test. The person is informed that 
they cannot go out their front door (or any other external door in the property), unless 
they have the express permission of the authorising agency to enter the back yard 
or front yard for a specific purpose (which is only granted rarely), and they have to 
run their ankle near the threshold of the front door in the range test walk around. At 
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the end of the range test walk around, the box stops making the loud piercing 
beeping noise; 
 Immediately after this, the HMU box uses the line to automatically upload the 
information to the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC). The field officer 
then phones the National Electronic Monitoring Centre to confirm equipment 
details such as the PID number and the HMU number, the range, and that the NEMC 
shift staff member can see three ‘yes’ and one ‘no’ coming up in the NEMC system, 
which means that the installation is complete and there are no issues with the 
functionality of the equipment. They then hang up; 
 The field officer explains the functions of the HMU box to the monitored person, 
clarifying that they need to pick up the phone on the box and press the blue button 
if (a) the box is ringing, or (b) if they want to speak to the NEMC. They only press 
the red button if they need to ring 999 emergency services, and that will put them 
straight through. The NEMC phone the person through the box a few minutes 
after receiving the field officer’s phone call (see point above), it makes a beeping 
noise and the monitored person practices answering it, while the field officer watches 
and helps if necessary. The NEMC shift staff ask them for their name and their date 
of birth, then provide a short amount of information about what they can ring them 
for and remind them that they need to be present at the home and answer the box 
when it rings during their curfew; 
 The monitored person reads (if they want to, some do not) and signs the one-page 
Visit Report that the field officer has been writing on during the installation process; 
 The field officer completes the visit, leaves the property and uses their PDA to 
conduct a random alternative monitoring check just outside the property on their 
way out to double check that the PID is registering, as well as to check the range. 
The RAM reading needs to be the same as what is recorded on the visit report and 
entered into the template that is ‘booked off’; 
 National Electronic Monitoring Centre ‘book off’: The field officer returns to the 
car, completes their paperwork (some choose to drive just out of sight of the property 
and neighbourhood, so people are not staring at them) and ‘books off’ to the NEMC 
by populating the template on their PDA and emailing it through to the NEMC. The 
types of information collected by the field officer within the installation template 
include: 
- PID (tag) number 
- HMU (box) number 
- Range (low, medium, or high) 
- Contact information, especially if they have a mobile number 
- Monitored person’s passwords 
- Whether the Standard Agreement Declaration (SAD) document has 
been completed and signed 
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- Whether it is an ‘intermittent signal area’, which may require a landline. 
- Directions and notes relating to the individual, their circumstances and 
the conditions of their order (including, for example, whether there are 
dogs in the premises that should be removed prior to any field worker 
visits) 
 Lone worker security device ‘book off’: The field officer then ‘books off’ in the car 
by speaking to the security device around their neck, similar to the ‘book on’ 
procedure for the same device listed at the start of this Install process.  
4.3 Storage and maintenance of the equipment 
Monitoring equipment is stored securely at the National Electronic Monitoring Centre in 
Uddingston, Glasgow, as well as at a few secure facilities on private premises (e.g., 
vehicle bases) in regional and remote areas of Scotland. Field support officers check 
and maintain the equipment, and field support supervisors monitor the logistics of 
ensuring enough equipment is allocated in different regions of Scotland, relative to the 
number of EM orders in the area. Field officers are responsible for checking their 
equipment at the beginning of each field shift, and cleaning used equipment at the end 
of each field shift, before returning it to field support officers or the nearest secure 
storage facility. 
Monitored people routinely request HMU box changes because they receive repeated 
automated or marketing phone calls. NEMC staff explain to them that, because O2 are 
the service provider for that aspect of the service and the box relies on a SIM card, G4S 
can change the equipment, but they cannot stop randomly generated calls occurring. 
Monitored people do not know the number of their HMU box and are reassured that the 
number is not given out to others, and that the caller does not know that they are calling 
EM equipment or speaking to a monitored person. The comments or feedback from the 
monitored people is that this can be a stressful experience, and their reaction is to 
wonder why they are being phoned and whether they are going to be told they have 
done something wrong. 
Section 5: Monitoring processes 
5.1 Risk assessment and management 
Overall, decision-making about risk and risk management tends to be the responsibility 
of authorising agencies, that is, the judiciary and courts, the Scottish Prison Service, 
and the Parole Board for Scotland. This sub-section considers risk from the perspective 
of the Parole Board for Scotland; risk assessment with regard to being curfewed to a 
particular address; as well as inter-agency responses to risk and duty of care to EM field 
officers. 
As described earlier, people granted a parole licence may be subject to an electronic 
monitoring condition, and this may be applied in general, as well as specifically to 
parolees convicted of sexual crime or violent crime who are managed through Multi-
Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA). Currently, an electronically 
monitored condition of a parole licence is not common. However, the use of this option 
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may increase if GPS tagging and tracking technology is introduced to Scotland with the 
emphasis on its use with sex offenders and domestic abuse offenders. 
When asked about the objectives and purposes of using EM with parolees, the member 
of the Parole Board for Scotland interviewed in this research drew attention to its 
capacity to form one component of a multi-faceted approach to risk management. 
However, they also cautioned against too great an emphasis on risk and restriction 
potentially affecting a person’s likelihood of successful order completion: 
In terms of conditions, the Parole Board are very conscious of not, making sure 
it’s appropriate that we don't overdo conditions, you know, because you can get to 
a stage where you think that individual actually has no choices almost left in the 
community because there are so many conditions attached to this licence, you 
know, so it’s trying to make sure it’s proportionate (Interview 23, Parole Board for 
Scotland). 
In terms of informing a risk assessment, criminal justice social workers or criminal justice 
social work assistants visit and assess the suitability of the proposed address to which 
a person has asked to be curfewed. For example, in the case of EM as a condition of 
parole or early release from prison with a HDC, after visiting the property and speaking 
with its inhabitants, a criminal justice social worker will complete a pro forma report and 
make recommendations about the suitability of the address and any recommended 
licence conditions, which is sent back to the authorising agency, for example the Parole 
Board for Scotland or the HDC coordinator from the Scottish Prison Service 
establishment which requested it. Authorising agencies are not bound to agree with or 
follow the recommendations of these reports, and are free to impose an order to curfew 
a person to an address in instances where a criminal justice social worker has 
recommended it is unsuitable. Criminal justice social workers are not routinely provided 
with the decision and outcomes after submitting their report and recommendations to 
the Scottish Prison Service. 
In interviews, criminal justice social workers and Scottish Prison Service staff highlight 
the need to balance the rights and interests of different people in the process of 
assessing risk and the suitability of an address. Most comments on this topic relate to 
disclosure and information sharing, that is, what and how much the individual should be 
told following the assessment, and what and how much cohabitants should be told about 
them. Staff from the Scottish Prison Service said that “non-disclosure of reasons is a 
way of not implicating family members who may have said to the prisoner that they will 
take them, just to get them off their back, but have said to the social worker that they 
don’t want to take them, but are too scared to tell them or don’t want to deal with their 
frustration” (Interview 26, Scottish Prison Service).  
Some interview participants highlight the fact that the individual may not have told their 
family or other cohabitants that they have been convicted, or they may have told them 
that, for example, they were caught shoplifting, when their offence was actually of a 
more serious nature. One participant highlights the need to be careful in what 
information is disclosed to others, raising the issue of the privacy and rights of the 
offender and potential risks they may face if disclose is made: 
It’s about the assessment and management of risk and if the address is unsuitable, 
the address is unsuitable … and it wouldn't improve necessarily with a disclosure. 
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So disclosure would be, I suppose, not the last stage if you like, but we’d certainly 
be assessing a whole range of things before we got to a disclosure point because 
we have to consider the impact of that disclosure on the service user you know, 
we’ve got a duty of care regardless of what offence they’ve committed you know 
we have to, you know we have to keep them safe as well so (Interview 10, Criminal 
Justice Social Worker).  
A sense of duty of care to balance the needs and rights of different parties involved 
was common in interview discussions about the use of discretion in decision-making 
about EM. 
Many participants, but not all, expressed moderate confidence in current inter-agency 
responses to assess and manage risk in the uses of EM of Scotland. Staff from the 
private services provider consistently expressed a desire for clearer risk information to 
be provided to them in light of their company’s lone worker policy in relation to EM field 
officers. 
Two particular views are consistently expressed about risk assessment and risk 
management by staff from the private services provider. In relation to risk assessment 
and the initial implementation of EM, participants persistently state that they believe that 
the private services provider should be given more information regarding risk at the 
point of an order being made, to guide the allocation of field officers. Several participants 
pointed out the limited information that is provided to the private EM services provider 
under current arrangements, and call for more information sharing.  
Such potential improvements to information sharing can be differentiated as occurring 
at different levels. Private EM field officers have no need to know of the full spectrum of 
information assessed by qualified helping professionals in statutory agencies. G4S field 
officers operate under a lone worker policy, unless there has been an indication by the 
authorising agency that there is a need for two workers to conduct a visit to, for example, 
install equipment. Contractual requirements and operational practicalities mean that EM 
field officers enter and work with monitored people in their homes during their hours of 
curfew, which is usually in the evening. In light of this, it may be appropriate for 
mechanisms to be introduced to consistently ensure that basic risk-related information 
is communicated to the private EM services provider, for example, through the 
introduction of tick boxes or sections in templates used by authorising agencies, 
especially courts, to specify in every instance the gender and number of field officers 
required. 
In relation to risk management and inter-agency responses to risks which arise during 
the period of a person’s order, private EM services staff tend to express confidence that 
staff from authorising agencies and Police Scotland act relatively swiftly if provided with 
information that a monitored person is putting others at risk, or are themselves at risk.  
The liaison we’ve got with the prisons is quite good. We had a case last week, we 
had concerns when an officer had visited somebody out on HDC, certain 
comments that he was making and his attitude and his behaviour, so we gave the 
prison a courtesy call to say we were concerned about some of the things and we 
were concerned for officer safety. They acted very quickly … phoned the guy to 
highlight to him that he’s at risk of being retuned because of his attitude and his 
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behaviour, so they certainly take our welfare and our concerns into consideration 
(Interview 6, G4S staff). 
Several EM field officers spoke of the option of communicating their way through a 
situation, but promptly leaving a property where there appeared to be escalation of 
aggression. Anonymous instances were also relayed in interviews where risk 
management was needed because of other people in the home, not because of the 
monitored person’s behaviour. 
5.2 Keeping track: communication with monitored people 
Monitored people routinely contact the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC) 
of their own volition, using their HMU box, with self-reports and questions regarding the 
equipment, changes in circumstances, or the conditions of their order. The following 
series of phone calls received by NEMC shift staff (while the researchers conducted 
observations there) are examples of the types of queries received: 
 A monitored person who was on a Court order from a ‘Special Sheriff’ (which  means 
there are strict conditions relating to the reporting of violations) called the NEMC 
during his curfew to say that he was concerned that his electricity was about to run 
out. He stated that he wanted to go out and buy more/top up his electricity. G4S staff 
advised the monitored person that they could not authorise him to leave the property, 
and suggested that he ask someone else if they were able to help him with this, for 
example, a family member, friend or neighbour. The monitored person was also 
reassured that the home monitoring box would continue to work if the electricity did 
run out, and that they could leave the property at the end of the curfew to top up their 
electricity. Throughout the conversation, the monitored person was clearly advised 
not to leave, and it was explained that, if they did leave during the curfew period, it 
would be up to the court to make any decisions about action to be taking regarding 
this. All of the information from the phone call was documented on the person’s file 
within the NEMC information system. 
 A monitored person on a court order rang up to ask about their curfew and the 
conditions of their order for specific dates or events, asking how they might go about 
applying for a variation on a particular date. G4S staff clarified that they would need 
to speak with their lawyer and that applications for any variations in conditions need 
to be approved by the Court because G4S cannot authorise absences. 
 A monitored person rang up to ask whether her court order could be adjusted for 
good behaviour. She had been given an order of approximately 10 months, which is 
a relatively long EM order in the Scottish context. It was explained authorised 
absences and adjustments to monitoring periods were possible, but need to be 
approved and authorised by the court which, if it agreed to an amendment would 
provide G4S with the necessary authorisation. The NEMC shift staff member stated 
to the researcher that this monitored person had been fully compliant with the 
conditions of her order. The monitored person said she might ask her lawyer to 
request an authorised absence or shortened curfew for an upcoming family event, 
occurring towards the end of her order. 
In interviews and observations, some participants exhibited a belief in the need to trust 
monitored people to a certain extent, albeit not negating the need for risk management 
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and consistency of approach to monitoring. Participants sometimes framed their 
discussions of trusting monitored people in terms of allowing them “to take responsibility 
for their lives” (Interview 3, Criminal Justice Social Worker) and to be given the 
opportunity to choose to comply and change.  
We need to trust prisoners on the tag to a certain extent. They need to be given a 
certain level of choice and freedom. You’ve got to give them trust. In most cases, 
they will be liberated and without supervision within weeks or months anyway. 
They are already assessed as low supervision and low risk to get HDC. Even in 
conversations with victims, I ask them “would you prefer them to get HDC and to 
take responsibility, and be monitored for a while to see that they’re complying in 
the community, or would you prefer they are just out soon with nothing, no 
supervision or structure? (Interview 25, Scottish Prison Service). 
Some Sheriffs and Scottish Prison Service interview participants spoke of the motivating 
potential of entrusting a person to be on an EM order, be it an RLO or a HDC, as a 
chance to prove themselves, instead of being imprisoned. 
It’s like all of these things, most effective community disposals are down to the 
relationship that’s built up between the offender and the person supervising it, if 
you don't have an effective relationship then the chances of success are reduced 
… Sentencers build up relationships, particularly in a small court, a sentencer can 
build up a relationship with an offender … Quite often they actually feel an 
obligation to you because you’ve given them a chance not to let you down, and 
then they seem genuinely upset when you know they do let you down and they 
have to go to prison but so I think a lot of it’s to do with relationships (Interview 16, 
Sheriff). 
In other interviews, discussions of trust were framed in terms of giving monitored people 
the “benefit of the doubt.” For example, Scottish Prison Service staff described 
situations where it is possible that a prisoner on HDC may have been non-compliant, 
but this has not been proven or verified. They hold the view that, in relation to allegations 
made by others and circumstances that do not pose a significant risk, the best and most 
common response is to phone the monitored prisoner and speak to them, giving them 
a warning about the need to comply with the conditions of their licence, and attempting 
to motivate them that being on HDC is their chance to prove that they can successfully 
complete the order. Alongside considerations relating to the individual as well as the 
wider public, prison staff also described institutional considerations as relevant to this 
approach, because HDC is one of the main “back door” mechanisms for reducing the 
prison population and breach has lasting legal consequences:  
We can’t just breach everybody. Once a prisoner is recalled to prison for non-
compliance, they can’t ever get early release on HDC again. If this happened 
extensively, it would pose issues for prison population numbers as increasing 
numbers would be ineligible based on a breach and recall from an earlier sentence 
(Interview 26, Scottish Prison Service). 
In summary, the uses of discretion in day-to-day monitoring and decision-making about 
EM are multi-faceted, where practitioners and authorising agencies have numerous 
considerations to balance.  
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5.3 Changes in circumstances 
5.3.1 Change of address 
If monitored person is on a court order (e.g., an RLO) and they wish to change their 
address, G4S staff can request a change of address on their behalf through the courts 
once during their order. After that, they must get their lawyer to request this through the 
courts. All authorised changes of address must be notified to G4S the same day that 
the Court approves them, so that the equipment can be moved and a re-install process 
can be followed. If the monitored person is on a prison-issued order or they are on 
parole, they must get the approval of the authorising agency for any change of address, 
and this is likely to involve an assessment of the property by a criminal justice social 
worker working in an HDC assessment team. 
5.3.2 Extenuating circumstances: deaths in the family  
In the event of a death in the family of the monitored person, the authorising agency can 
choose to suspend or adjust the order for a period of time. The NEMC staff make 
arrangements for the HMU box and PID tag to be uplifted for the period that the order 
is suspended, and re-installation will occur as per the standard routine when the order 
resumes. There are added notes that come up on the screen at the NEMC for a 
monitored person’s file to forewarn NEMC shift staff and field officers that this monitored 
person is grieving and thus requires added sensitivity and grace in all communication.  
In the event of extenuating circumstances, such as a of death in the family, if the court 
chooses not to suspend the order, G4S are contractually obliged to continue to follow 
routine procedure, including compliance and breach investigations for ‘out past curfew’ 
events and other missed obligations or violations. Interpersonal difficulties can arise 
when they phone at 7:00pm for an ‘out past curfew’ event, have the monitored person’s 
situation explained to them and then are obliged to ring again at 8:00pm to clarify 
whether the person has returned home and then follow with violation or breach 
proceedings, despite knowing that the monitored person is elsewhere due to a death 
having occurred. The information provided to G4S is documented on the monitored 
person’s file and the authorising agency is left to decide on whether this constitutes non-
compliance when the case is returned to them as a breach. 
5.3.3 Extenuating circumstances: crime victimisation by theft or damage to EM 
equipment  
There are infrequent cases of monitored people’s homes being broken into and their 
EM equipment being damaged or stolen by people who know they are tagged and 
curfewed, with the intent of causing them to breach and be returned to court or prison. 
Communication was observed during fieldwork observations involving a monitored 
person phoning in the evening to tell staff at the NEMC that the HMU had been damaged 
and stolen by others who forced entry into the house. This prompted a series of phone 
calls to verify with Police Scotland staff what had happened, and these inter-agency 
discussions confirmed the self-report. New EM equipment had to be installed in this 
instance, as well as documentation of all information relating to this case to enable the 
authorising agency to make a decision about how to proceed in these circumstances. 
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5.4 The end of EM: de-installation and uplifts of equipment 
This sub-section explains what happens when an EM order ends. During a de-install, 
prior to entering the house, the field officer completes the ‘book on’ process explained 
in the ‘full installation’ section of this report. The monitored person usually knows that 
they are coming, and approximately what time they will be at the property. If the PID tag 
has already been removed by the monitored person after the end of their last curfew, it 
is simply handed over to the field officer. If it has not, the field officer cuts it off. The field 
officer then checks the HMU box, to ensure that it is working and not damaged. The 
field officer completes a Visit Report, to state that they have visited and collected the 
equipment, and this is signed by the monitored person. If they are the premises holder, 
the monitored person is given a reimbursement form and small amount of cash to cover 
the cost of the electricity used by the equipment during the monitoring period. The field 
officer then leaves the property and does a ‘book off’ procedure, the same as that 
described in the ‘full installation’ section of this report. All of this information is 
documented on the person’s file with the NEMC and an order completion report is sent 
to the authorising agency. 
During the day, which is when monitored people are typically not curfewed, extensive 
phone calls and emails are exchanged by NEMC shift staff and field officers to 
coordinate the timing of equipment ‘uplifts’ (collection of equipment that is no longer 
attached to the person in the case of the PID tag or no longer being used in the case of 
the HMU box). When a person has reached the end of the last curfew of their order, 
they are informed that if they are not going to be available during the de-install they can 
phone the NEMC and are given instructions on how to safely remove the PID tag by 
cutting it off. In the case of uplifts, regardless of whether the order has been completed 
or not, the tag has usually been removed by monitored person, police, prison or others, 
with queries made and answers given throughout each day about the timing of when 
specific police stations close and when the gates of certain prisons (e.g., HMP Barlinnie) 
close for the night. De-installations involving field officers are timed, and subject to 
contractual conditions. ‘Uplifts’ of equipment, where it is no longer attached to the 
person, are not timed and not subject to contractual conditions. 
Section 6: Compliance and breach  
Section 6 describes the current types of issues and behaviours which are considered to 
be a violation of the conditions of an EM order or licence, and these can result in an 
order or licence being breached. Following this, research findings from this study reveal 
how some criminal justice practitioners respond to violations and breach differently. This 
section explains how and why this is done, and considers the implications of this. 
6.1 Violations and breaches 
The thresholds for breach are set nationally by the Scottish Government (2013a), and 
they are included in the contract with the private EM services provider. Currently, there 
are three categorised groups of breach criteria, however, these ‘levels’ are not 
hierarchical and do not indicate increasing or decreasing levels of seriousness (Scottish 
Government, 2013a: 12): 
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Level 1 
 Damage to equipment; 
 Missing the full curfew; 
 Strap tamper or attempting to remove PID tag; 
 Withdrawal of consent by the monitored person or the premises holder; 
 Threatening behaviour to monitoring staff; 
Level 2 
 Time violations and absences (which may vary depending on order type, but do not 
include missing the whole curfew); 
Level 3 
 Entering an exclusion zone or geographical location from which they have been 
restricted. 
While these are called ‘breach criteria’, they do not necessarily automatically all result 
in an order or licence being breached. For example, in the case of RLOs, some people 
can have small periods of absence during curfew that are documented as violations, 
but do not necessarily immediately return the person to court for breach of the order. 
Some of the most common types of violations of EM orders and licences are explained 
below. 
6.1.1 Out past curfew  
The ‘out past curfew’ event comes up as an alert in the NEMC system as soon as a 
person’s curfew starts and their tag is not detected as present in the location they are 
curfewed to. The majority of alerts are derived just after 7:00pm each evening (a 
common time for curfews to start). There are contractual obligations which dictate the 
time and manner in which this type of violation is responded to by NEMC shift staff. 
They place a phone call to the monitored person’s HMU box within a set short period of 
the initial out past curfew alert. When NEMC staff phone, and there is no answer, this 
data is input into the person’s record in the system, constituting an ‘absence’ violation, 
and an automatic alert is generated for NEMC staff to call again one hour later to see if 
the person is present and answers the phone call to their HMU box. 
6.1.2 Left home during curfew 
The ‘left home during curfew’ event comes up as an absence alert for the tag of a 
monitored person leaving the perimeter of the house (which is determined during 
installation) for a few minutes. The monitored person is phoned, asked for verification 
details (name and passwords), and asked why the system registered their tag as leaving 
the house. Their explanation is recorded on their file, and they are reminded of what 
happens in terms of reporting and the risk of being returned to prison or court when they 
violate a condition of their order or licence.  
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6.1.3 Denied absence 
If a person registers as being absent during curfew, and the NEMC phones them and 
they confirm that they were absent, they are asked for their account of what happened 
and this is documented on their file. An absence is a violation. If the person denies that 
they were absent, despite the equipment alert and any unanswered phone calls to their 
HMU box during the period of their absence, all ‘denied absences’ are investigated. An 
EM field officer visits the monitored person at an unannounced time during their curfew 
to inspect and test the HMU box and to verify that its range is the same as that in the 
NEMC system, to check their PID tag, and to take a statement from the monitored 
person about their version of events. A re-enactment of those events is then carried out, 
to determine whether a re-installation is required with new equipment, or whether the 
equipment is working as it should be – in which case it is a confirmed violation. It is 
explained to the monitored person that one of the conditions of their order is not to be 
absent during the curfew, as this constitutes a violation. All information is documented 
and relayed to the NEMC and put on the monitored person’s file.  
6.1.4 Tag and strap tamper alerts 
A tag is removable for health and safety reasons; for example, so that a doctor can cut 
it off in the event of a health emergency, or in the event of it getting caught in or on 
something in the course of doing manual work with machinery. If a tag is removed in 
these kinds of emergencies, monitored people have been given instructions to keep 
hold of the PID tag and tell the private EM services provider as soon as possible, so 
that this can be investigated, verified and documented. However, without an emergency, 
attempts to tamper with or remove the tag or the strap, or both, are considered a serious 
violation. An EM field officer visits the monitored person at an unannounced time to 
inspect and test the PID tag and strap, and to take a statement from the monitored 
person about their version of events. It is explained to the monitored person that one of 
the conditions of their order is not to damage or remove the PID tag or strap, as this 
constitutes a violation. If the PID tag or strap is damaged, or has been removed, a new 
full installation is carried out. If the person withdraws their consent to be monitored, this 
is a violation that constitutes a breach and is returned to the authorising agency. All 
information is documented and relayed to the NEMC and put on the monitored person’s 
file.  
6.1.5 Tilt alert 
Radio frequency home monitoring units (boxes) are equipped with technology which 
can tell if the box has been tilted or moved. Most EM orders and licences in Scotland 
do not give permission for a monitored person to leave the perimeter (walls and 
threshold) of the house during their curfew which may, in some cases, tempt people to 
move the box. All tilt alerts are investigated. An EM field officer visits the monitored 
person at an unannounced time to inspect and test the HMU box, and to inspect the 
tamper proof tape which shows whether the box has been unplugged, and to take a 
statement from the monitored person about their version of events. It is explained to the 
monitored person that one of the conditions of their order is not to tilt or move the HMU 
box, as this constitutes a violation. All information is documented and relayed to the 
NEMC and put on the monitored person’s file. In some cases, a re-installation of the EM 
equipment may be needed to ensure that it continues to monitor the actual perimeters 
of the house, which is established during a range test in the installation process. 
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6.1.6 Damage to equipment 
In circumstances where the monitored person’s equipment (including tag and home 
monitoring unit) is damaged or has been altered in a way that prevents the person from 
being monitored and completing the order, this constitutes a violation. All information is 
documented and relayed to the NEMC and put on the monitored person’s file.  
6.1.7 Failure to comply  
Where a monitored person does not consent and/or does not allow the field officer to 
visit during the curfew time (but before midnight) and to allow the NEMC to monitor them 
in the way required of the order, this is deemed to be a ‘failure to comply’, which 
constitutes a violation. All information is documented and relayed to the NEMC and put 
on the monitored person’s file. This information may be used in a compliance and 
breach report to the authorising agency. 
6.1.8 Aggressive or threatening behaviour towards field officers  
Where a monitored person speaks or behaves aggressively or in a threatening manner 
towards a field officer during a visit during the curfew time (but before midnight), this is 
deemed to be ‘aggression towards field officers’, which constitutes a violation. All 
information is documented and relayed to the NEMC and put on the monitored person’s 
file. This information may be used in a compliance and breach report to the authorising 
agency. 
6.2 Who deals with violations and breach? Decision-making and discretion 
The authorising agency (e.g., Court, Scottish Prison Service, Parole Board for Scotland) 
establish the conditions or requirements for dealing with violations in relation to a 
specific person or order. The parameters of the options available to them are 
established in national policies and laws. For a standard Court ordered RLO, a few time 
absences as violations may be allowed before it is determined that the person has 
breached their order and is returned to court. Staff from the private EM services provider 
have rather limited scope for discretion or decision-making, and are duty-bound to report 
non-compliance to authorising agencies within a set amount of time, which differs 
depending on the order type and authorising agency. The responses to violations may 
vary if a person has been sentenced by what is commonly referred to among key 
stakeholders as a ‘Special Sheriff’, a research finding which is explored further in a sub-
section below.  
There are different forms of interaction and documentation involved in communicating 
with monitored people about violations and breach: 
 When an alert response is generated, the private EM services provider initiates a 
phone call to the monitored person using the HMU box with a short period of time 
which is set out in the contract. The timeframe for initiating a phone call following an 
alert response is even swifter where an ‘away from’ requirement exclusion zone is 
established (i.e. the person’s tag is detected in an area they are excluded from), 
compared to other alert responses (e.g., their tag is not present in the home at the 
start of their curfew). 
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 Violation and breach warning letters clearly explain in detail the circumstances of 
violation and the event history to account for the actions taken by the private EM 
services provider to contact them, to verify if they were somewhere else, to confirm 
information received by third parties and other relevant information. 
 Breach return to court letters confirm that there is a citation or a warrant for the 
person on a court order, and that they are being returned to court. 
 For those on a HDC, the Scottish Prison Service and the monitored person get 
copies of the information. However, compared to the capacity for flexibility in the 
options available to the Court in response to violations and breaches within the 
parameters of an RLO, breach of HDC or licence conditions ‘is likely to result in 
immediate recall by the prison to custody’ (Scottish Government, 2013a: 12).  
 For children who have a Movement Restriction Condition within an ISMS order, the 
supervising officer, rather than the child, receives the written information about 
violations and breach. 
When an EM field officer confirms a breach, which would occur in the course of fieldwork 
during the evening, the information is documented and relayed/entered to the NEMC 
system. The following morning, G4S staff working in the NEMC with specific roles 
devoted to breach and compliance check visit reports and accumulated time violation 
reports to determine if there were violations in the previous evening. If these have been 
confirmed, and the monitored person does not deny them, or they have been proven 
through investigation by an EM field officer, and breach reporting thresholds have been 
reached, a breach report is compiled using a pro forma template, and there are different 
templates for different authorising agencies. Breach reports are written and sent 
according to a priority system, within a set timescale. Parolees and prisoners on HDC 
licences, as well as children and young people on ISMS orders, are flagged as high 
priority in the system to indicate that they are the first reports to be sent to authorising 
agencies. It is the decision of the authorising agency, or their supervising officer, 
whether a person will be returned to court in the case of RLOs, or breached and recalled 
to prison in the case of HDCs and Parole licences. All reports of non-compliance are 
sent within 24 hours, unless otherwise explicitly stipulated in an individual protocol. If 
the private EM services provider has been notified that the monitored person also has 
a supervising officer (criminal justice social worker), for example because they are also 
subject to a Community Payback Order, an update about non-compliance can be sent 
to that supervising officer only in the event that there is notification that this is in place 
and details of who that is. 
6.2.1 Judicial discretion and ‘Special Sheriffs’: differences in responses 
In Scotland, there is clear variation between sheriffs and courts in how violations and 
breach are responded to. Ostensibly, ‘Special Sheriffs’ are those who have established 
an individual working arrangement with the private EM services provider G4S, above 
and beyond the thresholds set out by the Scottish Government in the contract. This 
arrangement prescribes the specific requirements and timeframes of communicating 
violation information and returning a monitored person to court using a breach 
procedure. Some ‘Special Sheriffs’ specify that they will only allow one violation before 
the person is breached and returned to court. Other sheriffs in Scotland operate in such 
a way that the full spectrum of violations allowable under the nationally prescribed 
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breach guidelines set by the Scottish Government (e.g., a series of small violations over 
the course of the order) will be tolerated before the monitored person is determined to 
have breached their order and is returned to court. There is one entire sheriffdom that 
is designated as a ‘Special Sheriff Court’, whereas variations among others can be 
identified on a sheriff-by-sheriff basis, even within the same sheriffdom or court. To be 
clear, all information about monitored people regarding violations and breach is 
documented in their file, irrespective of who sentenced them. However, the flexibility 
and differences are observed in the diversity of reporting conditions set by some sheriffs 
(and not others), and the swiftness with which that documented information is expected 
to be relayed back to that sheriff, resulting in the monitored person being returned to 
court.  
The special reporting requirement and time thresholds for responses were developed 
under a previous contract with a different private EM services provider; however, the 
current services provider, G4S, have retained this as a way of offering an ‘additional 
service’ to engage members of the judiciary who might not otherwise impose EM orders 
as they believe the Scottish Government’s ‘standard’ time thresholds and reporting 
requirements are not strict enough. A few G4S staff spoke about this aspect of their 
service provision in interviews, including the following explanation: 
Many, many conversations [have been had] with sheriffs where the view is that if 
they’re in court they’re telling that person “and if you are absent I will know about 
it.” They then get a report at the end when the person’s completed, and that report 
states that they’ve had five absences and a warning letter, and the sheriff then 
complains that “well why wasn't I aware of that? Because I told them when I made 
the order I would ... Now if the judiciary fully understood the criteria, because it is 
written there within the contract, if they understood that then they would recognise 
that that is what they are making -- unless they make a special arrangement with 
ourselves just to, you know, so they have to intimate to us that they want this 
special reporting. We will offer that as a service to them because, as we know all 
sheriffs are very different, but they need to be satisfied that the disposal they make 
meets the needs of the court, and because of some sheriffs receiving a completion 
report where there were absences within it that they weren't previously notified 
about, they took the decision that electronic monitoring wasn't for them. So [we] 
had a piece of work to do to try and actually get them back on board to say “well 
that is just a guideline” (Interview 13, G4S staff). 
Another G4S staff member explained about the practicalities of the differences in 
response across Scotland, saying that “all courts are different” and that one person with 
time violations (absences during curfew) for a RLO might get a warning letter whereas, 
in a different court, another person with the same order and violations “could be returned 
to court in front of the sheriff. It just depends on the sheriff and what court” (Interview 9, 
G4S staff). 
Some sheriffs are critical of the current breach thresholds and reporting timeframes set 
nationally by the Scottish Government. They feel it should be stricter and returned to 
the sentencer as decision-maker more swiftly. 
Interviews with sheriffs in this study included both ‘special sheriffs’ and sheriffs who 
used the standard thresholds. In response to questions about why some sheriffs sought 
to establish these special arrangements with the private EM services provider, sheriffs 
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were critical of the breach thresholds and process set nationally by the Scottish 
Government. The phrase ‘surprising amount of leeway’ was used by more than one 
sheriff on more than occasion in interviews. 
I wasn't satisfied or I was quite shocked when I started imposing them [Restriction 
of Liberty Orders] to realise the level of non-compliance that was acceptable 
before reporting to sheriffs in the standard report, but having spoken to them [G4S] 
now I appreciated that they would set reporting criteria themself by agreement with 
me. So G4S would probably be able to tell you what the up-to-date record is as to 
what they’re supposed to do with mine … Their [the Scottish Government’s] criteria 
I think are completely unrealistic and presumably they’re cost driven. I don't 
understand them and there doesn't seem to be any logic in them … One of the 
things I say to the tagee, if that’s the correct phrase, the offender when they’re 
getting the tag is that “forget about what your pals tell you about how easy it is just 
to not comply with it and nothing happens”, I just say “I’ve got a special 
arrangement with G4S that I don't allow any breach of the order”, because I’m sure 
some of them think “well does it really matter if we miss one of the compliance 
periods” because their pals have maybe had an order by a sheriff that doesn't have 
a special arrangement and they say “well nothing actually happens to you”, so I 
do give them a warning that something will happen (Interview 16, Sheriff). 
In terms of breach, they do have a surprising amount of leeway, for example, 
people accrue small absences, like being late for a few minutes. In [place and 
name of court in Scotland], we tightened up the national guidelines of breach. We 
made it stricter, so that if a sheriff said to the person, “If you do this, I will know”, it 
was reported to us so that we would know. In terms of process, here [different 
place and court in Scotland], all the breach reports come to us as sheriffs, and 
have to decide what should happen. We don’t return all of them to court, but we 
can if we wish. Breach reports are sent to us very quickly in this system (Interview 
19, Sheriff). 
Well they do actually have a surprising amount of leeway in these … So they can 
go through an order constantly being five, six, seven minutes late getting back into 
the house. In [place and name of sheriff’s court in Scotland] we actually tightened 
up the national guidelines … because we thought there was just too much leeway, 
they were too slack really (Interview 20, Sheriff). 
Sheriff interview participants consistently articulate affirmation of their belief in the need 
for swift responses to non-compliance. The theme of time features frequently in their 
interview conversations. 
Some sheriff participants express a preference for their approach to swift, certain 
enforcement with Restriction of Liberty Orders, compared to enforcement and breach 
processes associated with other community penalties, in collaboration with criminal 
justice social workers. 
In interviews, some (but not all) sheriffs contrast the approach taken with Restriction of 
Liberty Orders, working with G4S, and compare this with their somewhat negative 
perceptions of enforcement and breach processes involving criminal justice social 
workers supervising people on community orders, for example, a Community Payback 
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Order involving supervision or unpaid work requirements, but no electronic monitoring. 
Two of those interviewed explain their views: 
A big advantage as far as I’m concerned of a Restriction of Liberty Order is that 
it’s impossible to sort of dodge the thing, because as soon as you step out of the 
house an alarm rings somewhere and someone is, from G4S is phoning up asking 
what’s happening, and then you know there’s a breach report and it’s almost 
impossible really to contest the breach … Whereas the other alternative to 
custody, Unpaid Work breach reports are the bane of our lives because you know 
people don't turn up for their appointments and they get a verbal warning, they 
don't turn up again they get a written warning, they don't turn up again there’s a 
breach report comes in and then the breach is denied first by them through their 
solicitor, and then there’s an investigation … So many months later you’re having 
to look and sometimes you end up allowing the thing to continue … so these things 
can just go on and on and on. Whereas with the Restriction of Liberty Order, it’s 
you know, it’s more effective (Interview 20, Sheriff). 
What the probation people would do would be they would get all the reports about 
him coming in late and going to granny’s instead of his girlfriend’s, and all this sort 
of nonsense and they would work away with the person as social workers do, and 
near the end of the order they would write in and say it hasn't been working and of 
course you know by that time it was past it you know. I just felt they were usurping 
their authority and even if they did step in at one point and recommend a breach, 
with all the bureaucracy it seemed to take months, whereas I knew that if I had an 
order and I say to them “right if you’re home late one night or you go out early in 
the morning or whatever or you cut it off, a light will go off in the control panel at 
HQ and I’ll get a report on my desk the next day and I’ll be granting a warrant right 
away (Interview 18, Sheriff) 
In contrast, one sheriff said that they preferred to work with criminal justice social 
workers in the supervision of people on community orders.  
Some interview participants feel there are too many differences between sheriffs and 
courts in response to violations and breach reporting and decision-making for EM court 
orders.  
The comments of a criminal justice social worker illustrate the sentiments of others in 
this research that the implementation of a court-based EM order is influenced by the 
judicial officer who authorises and monitors the order: 
I think that there needs to be more education on [breach] thresholds. I think there 
should be a wee bit of consistency … that is also a reflection on our judicial system 
in that a lot of it absolutely depends on what day it is, what sheriff you’ve got, what 
they had for their breakfast, who was there in front of you, how good is your lawyer, 
you know, how straight are you [laughs] a whole range of factors. It’s not 
necessarily a formula that if you do this and this then this happens to you, it’s a 
whole range of things and I wouldn't necessarily want to lose that, but I think we 
probably need to have a wee bit more consistency in relation to people’s 
understanding of what it is (Interview 3, Criminal Justice Social Worker). 
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Overall, differences between the judiciary in their use of EM have been noted by others, 
with Mike Nellis (2016: 182) observing that ‘sheriffs have been rather variable in their 
use of EM, as with so many other forms of community supervision, and as geographical 
inconsistency in sentencing is not commonly perceived as a problem in Scotland, there 
are no easy judicial or political remedies for this.’ Information on the outcomes of judicial 
responses to violations and breaches (e.g., a warning and continuance of the order, 
extension of the order by a few weeks as sanction for non-compliance, or re-sentencing) 
of EM orders across Scotland is not currently available.  
6.2.2 Prisons and decision-making about risk, breach and recall to custody 
The Scottish Prison Service (SPS) retain the capacity to make decisions about all 
aspects of HDC licences, including responses to violations, breach and recall to 
custody. Where a prisoner’s circumstances significantly change while living in and being 
curfewed to an address, they can self-return to custody, without this being considered 
a breach and formal recall to custody – because of the statutory exclusions, the latter 
would mean that they are not eligible for early release on a HDC licence again. Where 
a prisoner breaches their HDC and is recalled to custody, they have the avenue of 
appealing this through the Parole Board for Scotland. Nellis (2016: 187) observes that 
the Parole Board ‘has found against recall decisions in a third of cases.’ 
Scottish Prison Staff participants describe a cautious approach to institutional use of 
early release on HDC, both in terms of granting them and recall following non-
compliance. Interview participants relate this concern to the potential risks and 
ramifications if a prisoner on HDC re-offends and this becomes a cause for concern in 
the public domain. 
We don’t have to go on their [criminal justice social worker’s] recommendation. We 
tend not to take risks, we tend to do what the criminal justice social worker 
recommends (Interview 26, Scottish Prison Service). 
It’s not dissimilar to any organisation, but the fear of being blamed for something 
is incredibly powerful in SPS because if you sign a piece of paper to say this 
person should get something that allows him access to the community and 
something goes wrong, then there is a fear that people will say “well that’s going 
to come back to me, I’m going to be in trouble and my job is at risk if this person 
does something wrong or commits another offence” … If the risk assessment, if all 
the information is brought to the person, the attention of the person who makes 
that decision at the time and the decision is sound then fine, but getting that across 
to someone who has perhaps worked in an environment where they feel that there 
is a blame culture then it’s really hard to get across, you know, “you’ll be OK, don't 
worry you’ve made that decision on a sound basis”, but it’s still a big factor 
(Interview 15, Scottish Prison Service). 
Professional and institutional concerns about risk, credibility and public outcry, and the 
use of practitioner discretion are not unique to the Scottish context.  
Some interview participants in this study express the view that, because Home 
Detention Curfews are stand-alone orders, the Scottish Prison Service make decisions 
about violations and breach independently. Some participants go further to suggest that 
these decisions are influenced by institutional factors and fiscal pressures. From the 
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perspective of criminal justice social workers, these comments appear to be raised as 
a critique that information sharing and collaborative work are aspects of HDC in 
Scotland which are currently missing and warrant development. 
We don't have any involvement in so things like standalone Restriction of Liberty 
Orders and Home Detention Curfew orders whereby the governors are 
responsible for the licences of these. If somebody’s out for maybe two or three 
months and something significant does happen, nobody’ll know about them … It 
would be interesting to see the breach rate of HDCs for a start because there’s a 
lot of pressure put on SPS to get people out of custody … The governor you know, 
he’ll look at his reports you’re not breaching anything but the stuff that’s going on 
in the house might be quite significant and not only to you but it might be actually 
significant to other people. So it could be that when you go home your dad’s just 
been made redundant, your wife’s just got pregnant, you’ve got a whole lot of other 
pressures that are, you know, escalating and you could, if people knew about it 
you could maybe put an intervention in, but we wouldn't know about it (Interview 
3, Criminal Justice Social Worker). 
Some sheriffs believe that decisions about violation, breach and recall to custody for 
prisoners on Home Detention Curfews should not be made as an administrative 
decision by the Scottish Prison Service, but should be made by a member of the 
judiciary as an independent decision-maker. 
The government also brought in Home Detention Curfew which is a whole other 
ballgame, and most of us sentencers aren't very keen on it because it’s operated 
by faceless people with no transparency in the criteria … It wouldn't be terribly 
expensive even if one of us were to go out to the JO once a week or once a month 
and look down a few deserving cases and let them out early -- that might have a 
bit more independent credibility than the prison people who want to kind of balance 
their own books … so the home detention side of it a wee bit problematic but then 
it’s nothing to do with us (Interview 18, Sheriff). 
This sheriff went on to re-iterate their position of seeing Home Detention Curfews as 
having “some lack of transparency”, and they stated their belief that “it is a way of the 
State usurping public sentencing policy” (Interview 18, Sheriff). Such views resonate 
with those outlined by Nellis (2016: 187), who notes a more general tendency among 
Scottish sheriffs and their representation through the Sheriffs Association to criticise the 
use of early release through the granting of a HDC licence. 
In Scotland, there are strictly enforced conditions of compliance with a Home Detention 
Curfew. Once a prisoner has been breached and recalled, the current statutory 
exclusion criteria mean that that person is permanently ineligible for early release on 
HDC ever again.  
In interviews, staff from a charitable representative organisation urge the need to further 
develop responses to minor instances of non-compliance while on HDC, reflecting their 
support for moving towards more flexible, creative and person-centred uses of 
electronic monitoring in general. 
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There is scope for a much more constructive approach to handling breaches … 
Breach is used as rather a blunt weapon (Interview 29, representative 
organisation). 
Sometimes it is too risk-averse. There is no leeway or discretion (Interview 30, 
representative organisation). 
They question what is perceived as a strict and relatively automatic breach and recall 
to prison process followed in most cases for prisoners on early release. Instead, in 
response to violations and non-compliance which are not serious, they call for a more 
integrated and communicative review process which directly involves the prisoner 
themselves, before formal decisions are made about breach and recall.  
Both of these interviewees also reject the statutory exclusion which excludes all people 
who have breached a HDC from ever getting one again if they are incarcerated again 
at some point in their lifetime. The Scottish Prison Service use early release on licence 
with HDC as an incentive for compliance and pro-social behaviour while in prison, and 
being ineligible may have a negative impact on prisoners’ behaviour and motivation pre-
release.  
People who have breached the tag are denied getting it again – and there’s no 
incentive for them to change their behaviour … They [the Scottish Government] 
should change it. It is a nonsense argument that if you have breached it once, you 
will breach it again. With bail, you can breach it and that does not prevent you 
getting bail again, whereas with HDC that is not the case (Interview 30, 
representative organisation). 
Some Scottish Prison Service staff interviewed express their own frustration, in mild 
terms, at this particular statutory exclusion as a blanket rule because it renders a 
significant number of prisoners who may be ‘older and wiser’ ineligible to be released 
early, in turn resulting in an institutional burden by inhibiting efforts to reduce the 
numbers of people in prison. 
Interview participants also raised comments about what happens (or does not happen) 
when some prisoners evade recall to custody. Recently, a very small number of 
prisoners, having breached their HDC, have avoided recall to custody by remaining 
‘unlawfully at large’ for a period of time. Some of the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) staff 
interviewed perceived a level of constraint on Police Scotland resources which is seen 
to be affecting their capacity to prioritise pursuit of arrest and recall to prison of some 
prisoners who have breached their HDC licence. In these circumstances, more than 
one interview participant described having to “follow the Police up to ask if they are still 
looking for them” (Interview 25, Scottish Prison Service). Where a prisoner has been 
breached and been ‘unlawfully at large’, the Scottish Prison Service has the discretion 
to add days to their prison sentence upon their return to custody. 
Section 7: Diversity and vulnerability 
In recognition of the wide variety of individuals upon whom electronic monitoring might 
be imposed, and the personal and social circumstances affecting their lives, Section 7 
explores research participants’ perspectives on responding to diversity and 
vulnerability. One of the strengths of contributions by Scottish criminal justice actors in 
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this research is their pervasive social justice ethos and passion for ensuring people with 
particular needs or vulnerabilities receive tailored support to enable them to complete 
their EM order. 
7.1 Gender  
Only a limited amount of aggregate demographic data is collected and publicly released 
about monitored people in Scotland. The gender of monitored people is collected and 
reported by order type (G4S, 2016; 2015). In 2015, the gender split for Restriction of 
Liberty Orders was 86 per cent men and 14 per cent women (G4S, 2016). In the same 
year, the gender split for Home Detention Curfews was 89 per cent men and 11 per cent 
women (G4S, 2016). In relation to children and youth, the gender split for the movement 
restriction condition as part of the intensive support package of care was 44 per cent 
female and 56 per cent male (G4S, 2016). Tagging is a practice which involves physical 
contact with a person’s body in installing, checking or removing a tag. In Scotland, there 
is a policy that only female EM field officers can touch the body of a female monitored 
person, and this applies to both children and adults.  
Some interview participants expressed the view that tagging and home curfews are 
appropriate for women, and could be used more strategically and extensively in the 
future to reduce the female custodial estate in Scotland. One sheriff pointed out the link 
between geographical distance and differences in distance in terms of women’s and 
men’s prisons across Scotland by noting that, from some court areas, HMP Cornton 
Vale is “not exactly easily accessible” and that remanding women in custody there 
“would have made a big impact on their families” (Interview 16, Sheriff). Very similar 
comments were made by a prison practitioner who highlighted the same impact on 
women offenders post-conviction and advocated that, in many cases, electronic 
monitoring would be “a much better option than actually sending them into custody” 
(Interview 15, Scottish Prison Service). 
7.2 Age  
The age of monitored people is collected and reported by order type, and is not available 
as an aggregate mean total for all EM orders in Scotland. In addition to the use of EM 
with adults (defined as those aged 16 years and older in Scotland), some children and 
young people are also subject to EM tagging and curfews through a Movement 
Restriction Condition (MRC) within an Intensive Support and Monitoring Service (ISMS) 
order, through the Children’s Hearings System. ISMS involve intensive, multi-agency 
service provision and supports tailored to the young person’s needs and risks, 
irrespective of whether or not an MRC is imposed. The average age and the age ranges 
of children and young people subjected to an ISMS order is not reported, however, they 
are under the age of 16 years old. 
Different perspectives from G4S EM staff illustrate the spectrum of opportunities and 
challenges of using tagging with young offenders, especially where it involves a curfew 
to their family home: 
If that group [young offenders] could be kept in the community or at home longer, 
I think all the research shows that the longer they stay out of custody the more 
chance they have of settling down. I really think that’s the most important part of a 
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curfew is to make sure that young people don't end up in custody too quickly 
(Interview 11, G4S) 
Because they can't go out to see their friends, they then bring all their friends into 
the family home, so whereas before, you know, instead of going out to see their 
pals then they’ll just say “well I cannae go out so my pals are coming here” and 
the rest of the family have to sort of accommodate round about the fact that the 
person with the tag’s then got all his pals in and they’re drinking and partying and 
doing whatever they want to do in the family home … it’s difficult but that is, it’s the 
kind of things that all escalates towards the premises holder saying “do you know 
what, I can't do this anymore” because it’s too disruptive to the rest of the family 
or too disruptive to the household (Interview 12, G4S) 
Further research is needed to better understand the lived experience and collateral 
consequences (positive and/or negative) of tagging and home curfew on monitored 
people and their families as cohabitees, especially in cases involving youth and young 
adults. Families also need to be asked about their support needs and who this should 
or should not be offered by and why (e.g., discussions of statutory involvement 
compared to third sector services and peer supports), in an effort to prevent households 
being unduly placed under pressure because a family member is confined to their home 
for up to 12 hours a day. The premises holder can withdraw consent for a person, 
including a young offender, to be monitored at their property; however, the potential 
consequences of this within some family relationships and households may be 
considerable. 
Curfew restrictions for monitored children and young people are routinely later in the 
evening compared to those most commonly imposed on adults (which are often 7:00pm 
to 7:00am). A few research participants in our study voiced their support for this flexible 
and integrated approach, suggesting that using more punitive, tighter controls with this 
younger age group would “set them up to fail” in terms of increasing the likelihood of 
non-compliance. Conversely, some participants in previous research studies in 
Scotland have expressed ethical concerns and ideological opposition to the use of EM 
with children and young people under 16 years of age (see MacQueen and Rigby, 2010; 
Orr, 2013). Questions and concerns about the use of EM with this age group are echoed 
in the comments of an interview participant whose role and professional work history 
involves working with children, young people and adults: 
Most of them, to be fair, are teenagers you know about twelve/thirteen … but you 
also need to think about people need to be old enough to understand about 
restrictions, so if you’re fourteen or fifteen you wouldn't necessarily understand or 
even be able to comprehend the impact of having to stay in your house seven 
nights a week, you know from seven till seven … I think they should rethink 
movement restriction orders for young people, I don't necessarily think they add 
value.  If a child is stable enough and supported enough for that to work then they 
really shouldnae [shouldn’t] be on one (Interview 3, Criminal Justice Social 
Worker). 
G4S staff interviews and fieldwork observations did not necessarily express a view as 
to whether movement restriction conditions as a part of ISMS orders should exist; 
however, several participants drew attention to the fact that some children and young 
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people aged under 16 years have difficulty complying with the conditions of their order, 
even with the availability of social work supports. 
Electronic monitoring is used moderately extensively with young adult offenders in 
Scotland. In 2015, 39 per cent of people given an RLO were aged 25 years and under 
(G4S, 2016). Furthermore, one quarter (25 per cent) of the total numbers of HDCs 
granted were to prisoners aged 25 years and under (G4S, 2016). These figures begin 
to challenge a common anecdotal perception that some young adult offenders do not 
have sufficient developmental capacity (e.g., because of impulsivity and limited self-
regulation skills, time management skills, criminal peer refusal skills) or sufficient 
supports and circumstances to comply with and complete an EM order. 
The age cohort notably missing from the responses of those interviewed is that of middle 
aged and older people. This is particularly salient given that one of the potential groups 
for future targeted use of EM may be older people, especially where this might involve 
early release from prison. However, in seeking to tailor the uses of EM with middle aged 
and older people, due consideration is needed for the sensitivities and complexities of 
differentiating between them by their assessed level of risk (which, in some cases, may 
be low) or by the offence for which they were sentenced (which may be serious or high 
profile, or both).  
7.3 Language  
There are contractual obligations which require the private EM services provider to take 
certain steps in providing information to people who speak languages other than 
English. For example, one practitioner confirmed that, when an EM order or licence is 
imposed by an authorising agency, “it’s stated in the contract that we must provide, if 
they don't speak English, we must provide interpreters within a 24 hour period” 
(Interview 9, G4S staff), and language interpretation may also be required for 
communication with the person during the EM order. The private EM services provider 
must provide a written copy of the installation information booklet specific to the person’s 
order in their language at the start of their order. 
7.4 Education and low literacy  
A few interview participants discussed the need to tailor responses to monitored people 
with limited education and low literacy. In one interview, an anonymous example was 
given of a younger prisoner who was granted a HDC. They could not read or write, and 
could not tell the time using an analogue watch or clock. The prisoner understood the 
conditions of their licence, which was discussed verbally with them in detail; however, 
they needed the wording adjusted as “[they] didn't understand the times because they 
were in twenty-four hour format and [they were] used to it being like seven/seven rather 
than nineteen hundred to zero seven hundred” (Interview 24, Scottish Prison Service). 
To support the compliance and success of this prisoner to complete their HDC, a multi-
faceted and collaborative response was put in place, involving the support of prison 
staff, educational staff, a speech and language therapist, prison throughcare staff, EM 
field officers, and their family. A digital watch was used with alarms set for a certain time 
before their curfew started. 
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7.5 Deaf and hearing impaired monitored people  
A small number of deaf and hearing impaired people are placed on EM orders in 
Scotland. The following tailoring of procedures and supports are offered to enable their 
participation in EM. For equipment installations, the private EM services provider will 
arrange a sign language interpreter as well as the standard provision of written 
information. Contractually, the time constraints for different types of actions (e.g., an 
installation) are longer to ensure that a sign language interpreter can be present if the 
person’s hearing is impaired enough that other options are not appropriate. The 
installations and other types of visits take longer, whether or not an interpreter is 
present, because time is taken to write things down to ensure that the deaf or hearing 
impaired monitored person has clear access to and understanding of the information 
being provided to them. 
A special NEMC mobile number is given to deaf and hearing impaired monitored people 
so that they can text the NEMC. The special mobile number/line is on the Supervisor’s 
desk in the NEMC. Instead of a phone call, violation queries and notifications are sent 
via SMS text message to that mobile phone, which the monitored person is obliged to 
check and respond to (like others would a HMU box). Additionally, a number of deaf 
and hearing impaired monitored people can lip read, and have expressed their 
willingness to ask the field officer to repeat something or write it down if they do not 
understand. 
7.6 Poverty and social disadvantage 
Some interview participants highlight the fact that a person has to have stable electricity 
to participate in EM, or risk accruing violations when their electricity cuts out, and this is 
identified as an issue for people who encounter social disadvantage. In the course of 
fieldwork observations, researchers accompanied fieldwork officers to the homes of 
monitored people who had run out of electricity, to verify the equipment was working 
and the battery of the HMU box was fine following a power cut. Multiple phone calls to 
the NEMC of this nature were also observed. 
The comments in the following case study highlight the interactions between poverty 
and social inequality, and the value of managing the expectations of different workers 
about a monitored person’s compliance. A few of the fieldwork observations in this 
research involved going into people’s homes at the point of installation, and observing 
similar circumstances. 
Case study: Young adult with multiple needs curfewed to a temporary tenancy 
A criminal justice social worker gives an example in an interview of a young adult male 
they worked with who was tagged, who had multiple needs, and had breached other 
orders. He had multiple social workers and support workers involved. The criminal 
justice social worker describes the situation: 
“We got him released so we brought him back, he had a tag on, he got a temporary 
tenancy, in care all his life, really damaged with a tag on, got that sorted, got that put on 
and then I spoke to his social worker and [range of other workers] … I said to them “you 
do realise he’s [age, a teenager], he can't read and you’re asking him to sit in the house, 
he’s got no telly, no radio or anything else and he had his curfew” and they went “well 
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 what are we supposed to do with that?” I said “well do you really think it’s going to 
happen?” I mean I would even rather they said to me “can we get £50 Section 27 money 
to go and buy him a second-hand telly…” But they’ve absolutely unrealistic 
expectations, and these were all really experienced workers, but it was almost like they 
completely missed it. I always think if it was me [laughs] you know and I didn't, I couldn't 
read, I didn't have, this is a house that nothing in it’s mine I’ve only got a bag of clothes, 
I’ve got no you know, you’ve got nobody that’s going to come up and see me … Well 
think about the risk assessment, the reality is we want him to comply and we want him 
to be going down this path what do we need to do to support that and just restricting 
him to you know to his flat without taking into account just even just things like they need 
to have food. I mean it’s your basic Maslow’s hierarchy of needs!” (Interview 3, Criminal 
Justice Social Worker). 
7.7 Monitored people who have been victims of crime   
Some monitored people are phoned in advance to say that a field officer will visit, and 
this only happens in specific circumstances because visits are routinely conducted 
without any prior warning. The example given by NEMC staff during fieldwork 
observations was a male monitored person who has been a victim of crime, with several 
instances of victimisation occurring at his front door or in his house. This person will not 
answer the door in the evening because of these events, and can become quite anxious 
in the fear that he will be attacked again. Field officers call him shortly beforehand so 
that he knows to answer the door.  
7.8 Duty of care and the ‘home all day alert’ 
Framed in terms of ‘duty of care’ and not directly related to criminal justice concerns, 
the EM services provider uses a ‘home all day alert’, which is not contractually obliged. 
If the EM system recognises that a monitored person has not left the house they are 
curfewed to for a period of three consecutive days, they are phoned to check on their 
welfare. There have been cases of these home all day alerts and subsequent courses 
of action leading to the discovery of monitored people who have become seriously 
unwell and require hospitalisation, or are deceased, by emergency services. 
Section 8: Information exchange and multi-agency working 
8.1 Increasing integration and multi-agency collaboration 
One of the consistent themes across interviews and fieldwork observations is the belief 
held by most participants that more collaboration, integration and multi-agency work will 
be beneficial.  
The desire for more collaboration and communication is reflected in two consistent types 
of participant perspectives. The first is the critiques and perceived limitations raised by 
some participants of the way that EM currently operates in Scotland, predominantly in 
terms of stand-alone orders and authorising agencies that do not necessarily have to 
communicate about decision-making and actions to others. For example, criminal 
justice social workers tended to express a desire for more collaboration and multi-
agency information exchange, leading one research participant to offer their view that: 
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I think SPS [Scottish Prison Service] operate in kind of isolation and they will take 
things forward, and even when they’re taking things forward that we would support, 
it would be I guess seen as more effective or more productive if we were involved 
in that process you know (Interview 4, Criminal Justice Social Worker). 
The second common participant perspective is to call for more multi-agency work, 
including support for the integration of EM with other services that offer supervision and 
support. This is one of the most common suggestions when interview participants are 
asked about the future of EM.  
Support for more integration and collaboration was not a view offered uncritically or 
without pragmatic due regard for the differences between actors. For example, one 
participant was circumspect about the challenges of integrating offender supervision by 
criminal justice social work in the context of a privatised service provision arrangement 
in Scotland, saying “I’m not sure how far we can go in terms of integration between the 
two particularly given that one of them’s a private provider” (Interview 1, Criminal Justice 
Social Worker). A sheriff offered the view that “because it’s a privatised order, social 
workers unionised a bit chippie sometimes they never liked these people coming in”, 
suggesting that criminal justice social workers resent the amount of money being given 
to a private company for service provision to people on RLOs, compared to the funding 
they get for working with people on other community orders (e.g., Community Payback 
Orders), “so they really hated that and they virtually never recommend it” (Interview 18, 
Sheriff). Furthermore, some sheriffs in this study have indicated that, in some cases, 
they prefer RLOs over other community penalties such as Community Payback Orders 
because they remain the decision-maker, and some have gone further to state that they 
prefer this to having to work with criminal justice social workers because they differ in 
their perspectives of how best to respond to non-compliance and breach. The apparent 
ideological differences highlighted here are not insignificant, nor are they illegitimate or 
unimportant in considering the prospect of adopting a more integrated approach in 
Scotland.  
It should be acknowledged that, separately, the authors have already recommended the 
more integration of EM with multi-agency work to include the option of supervision and 
support for support monitored people (Graham and McIvor, 2015). This 
recommendation to examine more involvement by criminal justice social workers and 
the third sector was affirmed in public comments by the Cabinet Secretary for Justice in 
August-September 2015, who stated that ‘wrap-around support services are just as 
important as the technology itself’, calling for electronic monitoring to be situated in ‘a 
wider package of care’ (Matheson, 2015: 6). 
In an interview with two policymakers in Scottish Government Justice for this study, the 
theme of integration of EM with supervision and support was raised: 
In the past it’s been used more as a sort of a control, control somebody’s 
movements for the curfew periods … there’s been little integration. Look at support 
for the individual, it’s more standalone, which is what we want to move away from 
(Interview 22, Scottish Government Justice) 
The future so there’s a sort of strong political view isn't there, a political 
commitment to boost community sentences because the traditional evidence says 
that that’s how you help people stop reoffending or reintegrate into the community, 
 61 
  
and I think electronic monitoring has obviously its part to play in that (Interview 21, 
Scottish Government Justice) 
The capacity for creativity and flexibility needs to be reflected in future EM policy and 
practice developments, including if and where multi-agency supervision and support 
options are introduced. If EM orders and licences change from being ‘stand-alone’ to 
involve more multi-agency supervision and support, the capacity for creativity and 
flexibility needs to designed into these new arrangements. One approach to tagging 
does not fit all. Many, but importantly, not necessarily all monitored people will need or 
benefit from criminal justice social work supervision or the support of a third sector 
organisation. 
8.2 Data protection and privacy 
In terms of overall data ownership of information collected in the course of EM services 
provision, the Scottish Government own the data, and set the restrictions governing 
data management and sharing. However, other Government services do not have 
access to data on monitored people, and data protection protocols apply, including filling 
out forms to request information. Police Scotland and the Scottish Prison Service do not 
have access to the phone number attached to an HMU box. They have requested 
access to this information as a way of getting in contact with the person quickly, but this 
request was denied on the grounds of privacy and security issues. The monitored 
person does not know the number of their box. No one other than G4S have the number. 
In looking to the future, the themes of privacy and who should and should not have 
access to EM data are discussed in Section 10 in relation to the potential introduction 
of GPS tagging and tracking technology, which generates a large amount of location 
data.  
Section 9: Effectiveness and impact of electronic monitoring 
9.1 Costs and comparisons to custody 
The costs of EM are published annually by the Scottish Government. Currency 
conversions are offered here based on exchange rates in August 2015. The average 
unit cost for electronic monitoring in 2013-2014 was £743 (€1,043.73) (a significant 
reduction from £1,940 (€2,725.21) in 2011-2012) (Scottish Government, 2015a; 
Scottish Government, 2013b). This figure is based on total expenditure across all forms 
of electronic monitoring, including as part of a DTTO as well as part of Movement 
Restriction Conditions imposed on children and young people by the Children’s 
Hearings System. In 2013, the average cost per EM order per day in Scotland was 
estimated at £10.17 (€14.29) (Scottish Government, 2013a: 7). Annual costs of 
electronic monitoring are problematic to estimate, because most EM orders are not 
imposed for such a long period of time. Conversely, while per diem costs are difficult to 
calculate for prison sentences, the average cost per prisoner place during 2013-2014 
was £37,059 (€52,058.56) (Scottish Government, 2015a). 
9.2 Electronically monitored order completion  
There are moderately high rates of order completion, with approximately 8 out of 10 
electronically monitored orders completed in Scotland in 2015 (G4S, 2016). 
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There are complexities in discussing the influence of electronic monitoring on 
compliance with orders or licences in Scotland, as the factors contributing to compliance 
and non-compliance are multi-faceted (Graham and McIvor, 2015). Therefore, the 
following relate to EM order completion in Scotland which is a similar, but different 
indicator to that of compliance, because order completion data relate to final outcomes 
and, as such, do not necessarily give an indication of actual levels of compliance (that 
is, violations of conditions of the order that do not result in breach). Figure 5 illustrates 
the rates of (a) persons who have successfully completed Restriction of Liberty Orders, 
(b) who have had their RLO revoked by the issuing Court, or (c) their RLO has expired 
whilst the person awaited the outcome of a breach from the issuing court, in Scotland 
from 1 January – 30 June 2015 (G4S, 2016).  
Figure 5 Restriction of Liberty Order completions, revocations and expiries (%) 
by month in Scotland, 2015 
 
Source: G4S (2016: 4). 
There are few notable differences in order completion rates comparing court-imposed 
RLOs (community sentences) with prison-authorised HDCs (early release from prison). 
However, commentary by Nellis (2016a: 187) suggests that there have been changes 
over time in the rates of order completion of Home Detention Curfews in Scotland:  
By December 2009, 7,000 short-term prisoners had experienced HDC … Just over 
75 per cent completed the monitoring period successfully: only 1 per cent had 
been reconvicted of a new offence resulting in custody … The Scottish Prison 
Service’s (2010) operational review observed that the recall rate (one in four) was 
twice that of England and Wales and recommended incentivising the longer HDC 
periods (progressively reducing curfew hours after successful completion of the 
‘first third’ of an order to sustain compliance in the later period) (Nellis, 2016a: 
187). 
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From an average of three out of four prisoners completing their HDC licence period in 
2009-2010, the latest figures show that this has improved to an average of four out of 
five prisoners completing their HDC licence period in 2015. Figure 6 illustrates the rates 
of (a) persons who have successfully completed their HDC licence period, (b) who 
have had their HDC revoked by the issuing prison, or (c) their HDC has expired whilst 
the person is in custody or hospital, from 1 January – 30 June 2015 (G4S, 2016).  
Figure 6 Home Detention Curfew completions, revocations and expiries (%) by 
month in Scotland, 2015 
 
Source: G4S (2016). 
Order completion rates give some indication of what has happened during the order, 
whereas reconviction rates are one way of considering the effectiveness and impact of 
EM after the order and monitoring has ceased. 
9.3 Reconviction 
A small amount of data on one year reconviction rates for RLOs and other sentences is 
published by the Scottish Government. Based on a cohort of offenders sentenced in 
2011-12, a reconviction analysis indicates a 12 month reconviction rate of 39.2 per cent 
among offenders given RLOs with an average of 0.73 convictions per offender (Scottish 
Government, 2014a). It is also worth noting that the reconviction rate for RLOs has 
decreased steadily since they were made available nationally in 2002, down from a 
peak of 57.8 per cent in 2003-4, and it is now lower than the reconviction rate for people 
discharged from custody – trends which are illustrated in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7 Trends in reconviction rates (%) (1 year follow-up period) by index 
disposal in Scotland, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Source: adapted from Scottish Government (2015b: 30). 
* Note: Community Payback Orders started in Scotland in 2011. 
While similar decreases have occurred in reconviction rates following other disposals, 
they are more pronounced in relation to RLOs and Community Payback Orders, which 
started in Scotland in 2011. With regard to EM, this might suggest improved and more 
tailored use of orders with those who may benefit most from the features of electronically 
monitored curfews which may contribute to desistance (Graham and McIvor, 2015; 
Hucklesby, 2008), the increased targeting of RLOs on lower tariff offenders or a 
combination of both. 
However, drawing any inferences from these differential reconviction rates between 
sentence types is problematic because of differences in the types of offenders who 
receive different disposals – such as age and previous criminal history - which in 
themselves would have a bearing on the risk of recidivism. One way to lessen the 
influence of criminal history on such a comparative exercise is to compare reconviction 
following different disposals for offenders with similar numbers of previous convictions. 
The relevant reconviction data are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Percentage reconvicted within one year by disposal and number of 
previous convictions in Scotland 
Disposal 
No 
previous 
convictions 
1 -2 previous 
convictions 
3-10 previous 
convictions 
More than 10 
previous 
convictions 
Custody 10 20 36 61 
Restriction of 
Liberty Order 
29 26 36 61 
Community 
sentence* 
19 26 36 53 
Monetary 12 19 29 49 
* includes community payback orders and ‘legacy’ sentences imposed for offences 
committed prior to the introduction of CPOs. 
Source: Scottish Government (2014a) 
These data appear to indicate that, among those with fewer than three previous 
convictions, rates of reconviction are lower for those given a prison sentence than for 
those given an RLO. While this might reflect a deterrent effect of imprisonment on first 
or ‘lightly’ convicted offenders (that is, with fewer than three previous convictions), it 
may also reflect differences in the types of offences with respect to which RLOs and 
prison sentences are imposed.  For those who are more ‘heavily’ convicted (that is, 
having three or more previous convictions), reconviction rates are similar for those 
imprisoned and given RLOs. For these offenders, there appears to be no evidence that 
RLOs are any more or less effective in terms of subsequent recidivism than 
imprisonment (for further discussions of efficacy, see Graham and McIvor, 2015). 
There has been limited analysis of the impact of EM on children and young people under 
the age of 16 who are tagged and have a Movement Restriction Condition (MRC) as a 
part of their Intensive Support and Monitoring Service (ISMS) order. The data that is 
available is 7-9 years old, and is place-based which means it is not necessarily 
representative of a national cohort or trend. Vaswani’s (2009; 2007) quantitative 
analysis of ISMSs in Glasgow provided some evidence of reductions in reoffending for 
some children and young people, at time when half of all ISMS orders included a 
Movement Restriction Condition (MRC). Compared with the six month period prior to an 
ISMS being made, there was a reduction in the average number of offences per month 
committed by young people while they were subject to an order, and a 28 per cent 
overall reduction in monthly offending for those on an ISMS order with an MRC 
component (Vaswani, 2007). However, it was not possible to identify which elements of 
the ISMS (as well as any other factors) were responsible for reductions in young 
people’s offending; some questions and critiques have since been raised about the 
research methods and findings (see MacQueen and Rigby, 2010); and it also appeared 
that the ISMS order had less of an impact on offending by young women.  
Section 10: The future of electronic monitoring in Scotland 
Section 10 offers a summary of the key themes to emerge from participant comments 
when asked to reflect on the future development of electronic monitoring in Scotland, 
 66 
  
including their views on the possible future introduction of new EM technologies and 
modalities. 
10.1 Reducing the use of remand in custody: EM as a pre-sentence option 
Some participants initiated discussions of EM as a way of reducing the use of remand 
in custody. Without being prompted to discuss this topic, one participant asked “EM bail 
– I don’t understand why it was taken away?” and stating that “it would be very valuable 
to have back” (Interview 19, Sheriff). Indeed, a few participants voiced their support for 
the re-introduction of the option of EM as a pre-sentence measure in Scotland, linking 
this to purposes such as reducing the use of remand, achieving resource efficiencies, 
risk management, as well as perceptions of better outcomes for monitored people 
compared to being in custody. These perspectives are illustrated by the participant 
quotes below: 
I think more people are remanded than need to be but that’s a personal view … 
there are people on remand who could be dealt with in a different way ... I think 
one of the things that as far as RLOs are concerned that I would like to see is their 
availability as a pre-sentence measure so as part of bail conditions.  I mean quite 
often bail conditions say you will be at such-and-such a place at such-and-such a 
time and the only way that that can be checked is by a police officer going round 
which seems an enormous, I mean you know, wasteful use of resource (Interview 
16, Sheriff).   
I think using a restriction of liberty order as a direct condition or requirement of bail 
supervision or bail on its own without the supervision element would be a positive 
in terms of enabling people to maintain links with families, to maintain links with 
communities, with work rather than being stuck in a prison or a detention centre 
for three to six weeks when all that community contact, family contact, employment 
contact can be lost and in terms of work probably never regained (Interview 1, 
Criminal Justice Social Worker). 
It has been a decade since the EM bail pilot was introduced and then ended in Scotland, 
without national roll-out. Participant responses in this study suggest that the option of 
EM at the pre-sentence stage as an alternative to remand in custody warrants further 
consideration by Scottish criminal justice policymakers and other stakeholders. 
10.2 New electronic monitoring technologies 
Interview participants were asked for their views on the potential introduction of new 
tagging technologies in Scotland. A summary of the range of perspectives is provided 
here. 
10.2.1 Remote alcohol monitoring (RAM) tagging technology 
In considering interview participant comments in relation to this technology, a clear and 
coherent view does not emerge. A few interview participants needed the technology 
explained to them because they had not heard of it before (for a detailed review of the 
utility and limitations of remote alcohol monitoring (RAM) tagging technology, see 
Graham and McIvor (2015). Some interview participants questioned the extent to which 
the technology would assist efforts to reduce alcohol addiction and alcohol-related 
offending among monitored people, and instead suggested a stronger focus on other 
more rehabilitative and recovery-oriented approaches. One criminal justice social 
worker questioned the use of RAM with people who are habitually dependent or 
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addicted to alcohol, suggesting that, with this group, RAM “won’t make a difference” and 
that alcohol addiction “is extremely difficult to deal with, there’s a whole range of things 
that happen and it’s highly unlikely that putting a bracelet on somebody is going to stop 
them drinking” (Interview 3, Criminal Justice Social Worker). Similar sentiments were 
offered by a different criminal justice social worker, who said “I don't think it’s [alcohol] 
something that we should be necessarily monitoring”, and instead advocated 
supervision and support to address the reasons for a person’s drinking, whereas they 
thought an RAM tag might only have influence during the period of monitoring. 
Questions of consent and voluntary choice were also raised by a few interview 
participants.  
Another criminal justice social worker held the view that, if it is introduced, RAM should 
“be used purely as monitoring alongside someone’s rehabilitation or recovery with 
alcohol use” (Interview 10, Criminal Justice Social Worker). They had concerns about 
how non-compliance might be defined and responded to, questioning the utility of 
monitoring abstinence with the pragmatism and flexibility needed in criminal justice 
social work: “we work with people who struggle to manage on a day-to-day basis, you 
know, we have to be flexible in how we support people otherwise we would be breaching 
everybody all of the time and that’s not our job” (Interview 10, Criminal Justice Social 
Worker). 
Prison practitioner perspectives varied. One interviewee held a clear belief that RAM 
should be used with prisoners on a HDC: “I honestly think we should monitor their 
alcohol intake” (Interview 28, Scottish Prison Service). Others disagreed, for example, 
when asked about their views on the potential introduction of RAM tagging technology, 
one interviewee stated “I don’t see the need for them. They are setting people up to fail 
because it will be too hard to comply” (Interview 25, Scottish Prison Service). 
If there are plans to pilot or introduce the use of RAM technology in Scotland in the 
future, two issues feature in this study. The first is that there is a lack of familiarity or 
clarity among some practitioners in understanding how and why this particular EM 
technology might be used. Furthermore, the second issue is the need to contextualise 
the technology in relation to the desired goal(s) and professional practice cultures in 
Scotland, including examination of whether the primary objective is to strictly require 
and monitor abstinence and, if so, how non-compliance will be defined and responded 
to. 
10.2.2 GPS tagging and satellite tracking technology 
There is moderate interest and support among participants for the introduction and 
targeted use of GPS tagging and tracking technology, with acknowledgement that its 
use could be tailored and targeted to help achieve outcomes where RF tagging has 
limited capacity. The main example highlighted by participants was the perceived utility 
of GPS in being able to monitor restrictions away from exclusion zones for particular 
groups of monitored people, for example, people convicted of domestic abuse offences 
and sexual offences, people who repeatedly shoplift in a given area, and people subject 
to place-based football banning restrictions. One criminal justice social worker 
suggested that GPS tagging could potentially be used positively in tandem with 
supervision, giving monitored people the opportunity of “being able to evidence” 
compliance (Interview 3, Criminal Justice Social Worker). However, a few participants 
were cognisant that the ability to monitor a person’s movements, especially in relation 
to an exclusion zone, on its own, should not be conceptualised as a form of protection. 
One sheriff, who supported the introduction of GPS tagging, was pragmatic in 
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acknowledging that this technology and the use of exclusion zones “gives a false sense 
of security if you’re trying to protect somebody from violence or harassment; I think that’s 
always the danger of these things is that if somebody thinks that this is protecting them 
but it’s not, it’s just alerting somebody to the fact that somebody’s in the area but that in 
itself can't be enough” (Interview 16, Sheriff). 
Importantly, various participants, including G4S Scotland staff, warned against the 
proliferation of widely using GPS tagging as a replacement for RF tags. Support for the 
introduction of GPS tagging appears to be contingent on it being complementary, while 
also retaining the option of RF tagging technology. Proportionality and the targeted use 
of this technology remain salient concerns if it is introduced. Several participants 
questioned the reliability and practicalities surrounding the length of battery life in GPS 
tags, as they have to be charged regularly, which RF tags do not. For a more detailed 
review of the strengths and limitations of GPS tagging and tracking technology, (see 
Graham and McIvor, 2015). 
Interviews with criminal justice social workers appeared to evoke different responses 
depending on the EM technology being discussed. There was a tendency towards 
subtle scepticism about the current uses of EM and RF technology with home-based 
curfews, with some raising questions about how a curfew of up to 12 hours a day 
addresses the underlying reasons for offending behaviour. However, when presented 
with the question of what did they think about the potential introduction of GPS tagging 
and tracking, those criminal justice social workers seemed more enthusiastic at the 
potential prospect of tailoring monitoring to ‘away from’ restrictions, seemingly 
welcoming this new development if they become the supervising officer (i.e. working in 
collaboration with the judiciary and the courts) and if GPS can be used for the objective 
of criminogenic risk management and reducing reoffending.  
When Scottish Government policymakers were asked in an interview about what more 
creative uses of EM might potentially look like in Scotland in the future, their response 
focused on positive practices from other European countries, linking GPS technology 
with more wider reintegrative approaches to EM: 
The Netherlands again use GPS to ensure that people are where they say they’re 
going to be as opposed to that they’re curfewed to their home so that they are at 
work, that they are at school, that they are at rehab, that they are at classes where 
they’re mixing with different groups of friends … so that’s a real creative use, a 
real positive and a true reintegration type of use and that’s it, they can do that 
because they have a different technology and we don't have that technology, so 
potentially if we start introducing a different technology then we can use it more 
creatively (Interview 21, Scottish Government Justice). 
The Dutch approach to EM highlighted here by policymakers involves the capacity to 
use GPS technology in combination with an integrated approach based on supervision, 
as well as positive opportunities and supports for rehabilitation and desistance. These 
topics are discussed further in the conclusion and recommendations of this report. 
Participants did not tend to raise the suggestion of introducing police-led uses of 
‘voluntary’ GPS tagging and tracking technologies of people with convictions who are 
not currently subject to an order, like the police initiatives in England and Wales. A Police 
Scotland interview participant was asked for their perspective about these tagging 
initiatives and whether they thought there would be grounds for introducing this in 
Scotland? In response, they raised questions about the ethics of consensual 
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surveillance, as well as a need to consider public perceptions and trust of the institution. 
They stated that “Police Scotland are in a lot of public contention at the moment because 
of our use of consensual search in public, so my view may not be the same as my 
colleagues.  I would find consensual surveillance of somebody, however professionally 
convenient, a little bit of an issue in terms of trust and rights balance between us and 
the population” (Interview 2, Police Scotland). They also raised questions about 
proportionality and the need to avoid the proliferation of surveillance, especially in the 
form of active monitoring enabled by GPS technology, suggesting that, if this was 
introduced, “there should be a presumption of innocence until proven guilty so we 
shouldn't, I don't think, be watching the data the whole time for all those people who are 
monitored” (Interview 2, Police Scotland). An interview participant from a charitable 
representative organisation raised similar concerns, stating that if police were seeking 
to have the capacity to do “a sort of trawling exercise looking for information about where 
somebody is without due cause then I would block that entirely because I think that is 
not only a waste of police time but that is not appropriate because just because 
somebody’s on some kind of electronic monitoring it doesn't mean that they are 
necessarily going to go about committing more offences” (Interview 29, Representative 
organisation). These perspectives highlight the need for in-depth consideration of the 
penological purposes and ethical and legal ramifications of introducing new 
technologies, especially where the boundaries around privacy and liberty, as well as 
proportionality, should be set.   
10.3 Lived experiences of electronic monitoring: address knowledge gaps 
Different interview participants asked about or commented on the absence of in-depth 
research involving monitored people, their families and other cohabitants, and victims 
of crime in Scotland. The earlier sub-section of this report about the scope and 
limitations of this research acknowledges the absence of their voices and lived 
experiences. Coproduction of research agendas to encourage meaningful input 
participation is necessary with these people and groups in the near future in Scotland 
to ensure that this knowledge gap is addressed. 
In this study, a staff member of a representative organisation was optimistic that some 
initial progress has been made in enabling more consideration and inclusion of the 
perspectives and experiences of people with convictions by policymakers in the Scottish 
Government, albeit with the recognition that more of this is needed. In discussing the 
importance of considering lived experiences, they offered the view that “there is a 
general feeling that the culture of justice in Scotland is changing, it is getting more 
progressive … It is interesting times in Scotland. There is great potential for change. 
Does EM have a role in that? Yes it does …” (Interview 30, Representative 
organisation). 
10.4 Policy and practice leadership to make EM more fit-for-purpose 
Technology is not and should not be the sole and dominant focus of how and why the 
use of EM is developed. Objectives and penological purposes remain important 
concerns. In terms of a key focus of this research project, it is important to consider who 
should lead and influence the use of more creative, flexible, and innovative changes? 
This is different but still related to the more general question of who should have ‘a place 
at the table’ of co-producing EM, in terms of the range of stakeholders involved.  
In this research, some of those interviewed tend to support more strategic and creative 
leadership of EM policy and practice development by government or public service 
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actors, for example, suggesting changes that, if enacted, will largely require the 
leadership of Scottish Government policymakers, Scottish Prison Service staff, Criminal 
Justice Social Workers, the judiciary, or the Parole Board. In this vein, the consultative 
and collaborative approach to considering the future of EM in Scotland through a 
national consultation and an EM Working Group should be recognised and celebrated 
as grounds from which more innovation and fruitful development might be expected. 
Some interview participants are resolute in describing the current role of the private 
sector EM service providers as one of ‘technicians’, involving contractual compliance to 
carry out tasks of equipment installation/checking and monitoring administration, not 
necessarily to change EM substantively nor to ‘drum up more business’. At the coalface, 
public service actors such as criminal justice social workers and prison reintegration 
and throughcare staff are better placed to assess and lead changes which seek to better 
address criminogenic risk with the objective of reducing re-offending and promoting 
community integration. Similarly, encouragement of greater public service leadership in 
EM is echoed in recent propositions by Mike Nellis (2016a; 2016b) and the findings of 
the recent Scottish and international review of EM conducted by the authors (Graham 
and McIvor, 2015).  
Further integration and a more advanced capacity for multi-agency work features in the 
discussions of future developments raised by two Scottish Government policymakers. 
One acknowledges that “there’s been little integration”, with EM being used in the past 
as “more of a control”, but that the use of stand-alone approaches are “what we want to 
move away from” (Interview 22, Scottish Government Justice). Another emphasised the 
current political commitment to boosting and building community sentences, including 
EM, as part of a wider shift in penal policy to focus on helping “people stop reoffending 
or reintegrate into the community” (Interview 21, Scottish Government Justice). In other 
words, there is a shift in focus away from the simplistic and standardised approach of 
using EM as an isolated measure over the last 15 years. 
A further important consideration is that of funds and resources for future developments. 
For example, greater involvement and integration of criminal justice social workers and 
local authorities, or prison reintegration and throughcare staff, may or may not result in 
cost savings for prisons and courts. It is more likely to involve some level of cost shifting, 
in the event that less people are sent to prison, and with due recognition that criminal 
justice social workers and local authorities will require commensurate funds and 
resources to become more substantively involved in EM than they currently are. 
Although, any fiscal benefits will be lost if the phenomenon of net-widening is occurring 
in Scotland. It is imprudent to make any concrete predictions here, due to the lack of 
available data. 
Section 11: Conclusion and recommendations 
The primary purpose of this research report is to outline in detail how EM is currently 
used in Scotland. In a dynamic period in Scottish criminal justice and penal 
policymaking, this has proven to be a considerable task. There are a few features of 
this research which we wish to draw attention to in closing, as this particular moment in 
Scottish criminal justice represents an opportunity for policymakers and practice leaders 
to co-create more strategic, creative and fit-for-purpose uses of electronic monitoring.  
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11.1 Recommendations 
Consideration should be given to the following, which are based on the findings of this 
research: 
1. Clarify national breach criteria and responses to non-compliance. Consider 
consolidating breach reporting timeframes and thresholds into two nationally 
available options – standard and intensive – to foster consistency between decision-
makers and authorising agencies. 
2. Introduce mechanisms to give courts and prisons the choice of imposing a 
supervision requirement with EM modalities involving a ‘supervising officer’, or to 
make EM a condition of other orders, to enable more multi-agency work and 
reintegrative supports for monitored people. Implementing integration and the option 
of supervision will necessitate commensurate funds and resources. However, the 
introduction of supervising officers will enable decision-making to reduce the volume 
of queries for order variation which are currently being put before authorising 
agencies such as the courts, which may reduce workload churn and costs. 
3. Authorising agencies should consistently instruct the private EM services provider 
about the number and gender of field officers needed to visit each person/household. 
This is necessary to further ensure excellent duty of care and risk management with 
regard to all parties involved. 
4. Introduce and encourage wider use of mechanisms which motivate and reward 
monitored people’s compliance and desistance, including graduated changes in 
regimes and conditions, as well as a mechanism to allow authorising agencies to 
terminate an EM order or condition early. 
5. Abolish the statutory exclusion for Home Detention Curfew (HDC) licences which 
permanently excludes prisoners who have previously breached a HDC licence. It is 
inefficient and inequitable. 
6. Consider more creative collective uses of EM with people given a custodial 
sentence, similar to Scandinavian and Dutch approaches, which feature integrated 
supports for desistance. 
7. More data should be collected and released about the current uses of electronic 
monitoring, and more independent research is needed in Scotland in the future: 
 A greater quantity and quality of data (particularly statistical data, as well as 
aggregate demographic information about monitored people) needs to be 
collected about the effectiveness of electronic monitoring in Scotland and 
made publicly available. 
 Ensure future developments in EM policies and practices are informed by the 
perspectives and lived experiences of monitored people, their families, and 
victims of crime, as well as other interested citizens. More independent 
research is needed. 
8. Initiate greater awareness-raising among professionals, media and the public about 
EM in Scotland.  
Electronic monitoring is a tool which can be used for different purposes; however, EM 
is not a panacea and any expectations about its impact after monitoring has ceased 
should be truncated. Monitored people benefit from positive supports and opportunities 
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to help them leave crime behind, which extend far beyond time-limited and place-based 
restrictions. Tagging technologies and equipment should not be allowed to 
unnecessarily dominate discussions of EM and offender supervision, now or in the 
future. One of the key findings of this study is that interview participants are clear in both 
their support for the introduction of targeted and proportionate use of GPS tagging, as 
well as their belief that GPS should not supersede or replace the use of RF tagging. 
Both have utility, and can be used within a wider approach to achieve different 
penological objectives.  
A moderate level of optimism and momentum is observed among Scottish stakeholders 
about the prospect of integrating the use of EM with the supervision work of criminal 
justice social workers, shifting EM from an isolated ‘stand-alone’ approach to include 
more tailored service provision. In addition to oversight and interventions by 
practitioners in statutory bodies, there is a place for a wider range of services and 
support options to be offered to monitored people and their families by third sector 
organisations, as well as peer mentoring and mutual aid supports. The openness to 
integration among participants seems to be predicated on a pragmatic and widespread 
recognition that tagging technology with the requirement of staying home or staying 
away from a place, in and of itself, does not change lives. This is imposed mostly as a 
punishment, and it may (or may not) deter certain behaviours for a time. Objectives of 
supporting rehabilitation and desistance are better realised in the context of supervisory 
relationships and desistance-oriented supports and regimes in which EM may only be 
one feature (see Graham and McIvor, 2015).  
There remains an onus on policymakers and practice leaders to ensure that, where new 
mechanisms and options are introduced in moves towards integration and collaborative 
supports, that there are checks and balances embedded in assessment and decision-
making processes to ensure that uses of EM orders or conditions are proportionate and 
targeted. A greater quality and quantity of data collection and availability throughout 
such developments will aid appraisal of this. It will be costly and counterproductive to 
see a surge in the addition of EM in cases where another community penalty would 
otherwise be imposed anyway – in effect meaning that EM is added because it can be, 
but not necessarily because it should be.  
Access to EM in Scotland appears to be dependent on the decision-maker involved. 
Two issues are highlighted in this study with regard to access to EM at the ‘front end’ 
and ‘back end’ of the criminal justice process. The disparities between sheriffs and 
courts as to how much or how little RLOs are imposed across Scotland raise the 
concerning possibility of ‘postcode justice’, given that this sentence is understood as 
one of the main alternatives to imprisonment. Members of the judiciary and their leaders 
should reflect further on the issues involved and avenues for generating more 
consensus amongst one another with a view to a more nationally consistent approach 
to the uses of EM. With regard to access to EM at the other end of the criminal justice 
process, it is recommended that the statutory exclusion criteria for HDC licences be re-
considered. In particular, consideration should be given to the abolition of the statutory 
exclusion which permanently excludes prisoners who have previously breached a HDC 
licence. It is inefficient and inequitable. It unnecessarily inhibits decarceration efforts to 
reduce prison populations where Scottish prisons are compelled to retain statutorily 
excluded prisoners in custody who may have the capacity to comply with and complete 
a HDC. Eligibility for early release on a HDC licence should be assessed and decided 
by staff in the authorising based on a person’s current capacity to comply and desist 
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(given the right supportive circumstances for change, e.g., a suitable and safe 
address/home environment), which should include consideration of, but should not be 
solely limited to their breach and recall record. 
Adjustments to current arrangements are recommended in order to promote increased 
creativity and flexibility in decision-making and tailoring of EM regimes, as well as 
increased integration. We recommend the introduction and widespread use of 
mechanisms which motivate and reward monitored people’s compliance and 
desistance, including graduated changes in regimes and conditions, as well as a 
mechanism to allow authorising agencies to terminate an EM order or condition early. 
Such adjustments will allow further responsivity to the individuals and circumstances 
involved, as one approach to tagging does not fit all. 
The findings of this study show that there is an evident need to clarify the national breach 
criteria. This includes critically reflecting on how violations are categorised and whether 
‘breach’ criteria is the best choice of language, or whether ‘non-compliance’ criteria or 
something similar better communicates what the criteria encompass, thus allowing the 
word ‘breach’ to be reserved to describe the actions of the authorising agency regarding 
an individual’s order. In consultation with key actors, consideration should be given to 
the consolidation of breach reporting timeframes and thresholds into two nationally 
available options – standard and intensive – to foster consistency and preclude the 
establishment of individual ‘special sheriffs’ arrangements. Also, in order to further 
improve risk management and balance duty of care to the different people involved, it 
is recommended that courts, prisons and the Parole Board for Scotland should routinely 
inform the private EM service provider of the number and gender of field officers needed 
for visits with every tagged person/premises.  
In terms of the future development of EM in Scotland, in-depth consideration should be 
given to more creative collective uses of EM with people given a custodial sentence, 
similar to approaches in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, featuring integrated and 
meaningful supports for rehabilitation, desistance and reintegration. For this to occur, it 
will require more than implicit encouragement of decision-makers and practitioners to 
use EM more as an alternative to prison. Ad hoc shifts in practice decision-making 
(which may be realised differently across the country) are not enough to systematically 
reduce the use of custodial sentencing in Scotland; bolder visions and infrastructure for 
diversion and decarceration are needed. Learning from the innovations and 
experiences of other leading jurisdictions is recommended, alongside the need for future 
developments in EM policies and practices to be informed by the perspectives and lived 
experiences of monitored people, their families, and victims in Scotland. More 
independent research is needed in this latter area; people with lived experiences offer 
a source of knowledge which is valuable in informing policy and practice advances.  
Furthermore, it would be beneficial and timely to conduct independent research 
regarding media and wider community perceptions of EM in Scotland, which may 
involve conducting secondary analysis of media discourses as well as primary research 
with members of the public to consider perceptions of credibility, legitimacy and 
effectiveness (as a penal measure itself, as well as in the context of being an alternative 
to custody). The modest amount of existing research in this area internationally is mainly 
derived from the United States, which is a markedly different socio-political and fiscal 
context to that of Scotland (see Graham and McIvor, 2015 for a review of existing 
literature in this area). Participants in this study, particularly the judiciary and prison 
staff, have made comments which indicate they are mindful of public perceptions of EM 
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punishment and its ‘credibility’ as a community sanction or in combination with other 
community sanctions. It is likely that such perceptions of ‘credibility’ and making 
decisions about risk and public protection are also relevant if further consideration is 
given to the potential use of EM at the pre-sentence stage, as one of the findings of this 
study is that some participants think this modality should be available in Scotland as an 
alternative to remand. Greater understanding of perceptions can help to inform 
communication strategies about EM and other community penalties in Scotland. 
As more advanced knowledge is developed about EM in Scotland, there is an ongoing 
need to initiate greater awareness-raising among professionals, the media and the 
public about the uses of EM as a community sanction. A coherent and persuasive media 
and communication strategy is needed to inform criminal justice actors and communities 
about the strengths and utility of electronic monitoring tagging technologies, the 
differences between RF tagging and GPS satellite tagging and tracking, and their 
respective limitations, as well as a clear sense of objectives and the target groups being 
prioritised. Scottish Government policymakers and the EM Working Group have already 
initiated actions to consider how best to approach awareness raising and media and 
community engagement efforts; the findings of this research affirm the value of pursuing 
this.  
We conclude this report with a reminder raised elsewhere (Graham and McIvor, 2015: 
125): in reflecting on the current uses of EM in Scotland and in a wider research project 
which compares Scottish experiences with those of other European jurisdictions, it 
seems appropriate to end with observations by Nellis and Vanhaelemeesch (2012: 1) 
reflecting on international evidence and experience. 
Not all uses of EM have been wise ... So, in thinking about a “gold standard” for 
EM in all its aspects we should remember that it is not EM in itself that we are 
judging, but the contribution that EM could and should make to civilised and 
constructive criminal justice systems, which make only sparing use of 
imprisonment and which are as firmly committed to the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of offenders as they are to public protection (Nellis and 
Vanhaelemeesch, 2012: 1). 
Each of these penal aims, and achieving the right balance between them, remain 
important considerations in the operation, and potential development, of electronic 
monitoring in Scotland so as to, in the words of Nellis, pursue opportunities to use EM 
‘wisely and well’. 
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